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Abstract 
This thesis confronts the urgency with which new language and vocabulary is required to 
move beyond linear assumptions in mainstream science and humanities, as well as global 
policy-making. I examine Gregory Bateson’s body of work in history and philosophy of 
science, psychiatry and psychotherapy, anthropology, biology and ecology designed to 
communicate the necessarily interdisciplinary consideration for a nonlinear and recursive 
investigation of the self, other, and environment. Such intellectual forays cannot dismissed as 
non-scientific. I offer definitions and contextualizations of key terms derived from 
cybernetics, new materialisms, and posthumanism (such as emergence, process, paradox, 
metaphor, fractality) to speak about the ramifying intricacies and pathologies in processes of 
knowing at various different scales. I conclude with a theory of resonance that may offer the 
epistemological groundwork with which to construct a metaphor of precarious intervention 
and to model a critical relationship between epistemology and ethics. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
The world that we know and participate in is moulded and edited according to what we 
believe about it, as well as how we think about such things. Our beliefs about ourselves, the 
others that we encounter, and the shared environments we occupy will determine the reality 
we live in, and such material contexts allow for these perception-determining beliefs to 
emerge in turn. I am developing a new way of thinking about thinking, which includes 
thinking about the nature of order and organization in living systems. The living systems in 
question are varied in form: one’s network of ideas, a natural ecology, a collective social 
organization, an interpersonal relationship, or even a human body. I believe this meta-level 
task must be at the forefront of all scientific and theoretical inquiry, for science and theory 
must encounter their own potential for material repercussions. I believe that at a basic level, 
these disciplines can produce themselves in ways that do not harm or diminish the systemic 
nature of oneself or the world. But such ideas must be articulated through a radically new 
language rather than one of linear purpose and commodity value as valorized by late 
industrial capitalist society. This thesis introduces and elaborates upon certain aspects of the 
vocabulary used within scientific circles of the mid-to-late twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries (cybernetics, systems theory, psychoanalysis, new materialisms, posthumanism), 
bridged across each other with their shared desire to articulate the complexity, and perhaps 
indeed the beauty of their subject matter. I conclude with an entry of my own, the word and 
concept of ‘resonance’ which I propose as conducive to the ideas of systemic complexity in 
its open-ended and interdisciplinary usage. 
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Preface 
  
The following chapters are an accumulation of my studies across literatures and disciplines 
that have offered the enthrall of yet unrecognized resonances between distinct people and 
ideas. This investigation began with Gregory Bateson and his prescient anticipation of where 
and how a new paradigm for recursive explanation and scalar complexity might emerge in 
science. My prolonged search for relevance and meaning is by its very nature ongoing, yet it 
is my hope that this thesis project has recorded the wild movement of one observer’s search 
patterns as they emerge alongside and entwine with others. 
The first chapter, “Epistemic Precarity and Processual E(mergence),” begins by outlining the 
problem of language, translation, and mutual understanding at the ground level of my inquiry 
into epistemological error and change in the fields of scientific investigation. I entwine 
Gregory Bateson’s positing of epistemology as a meta-science in his later years with the 
concurrent and continuing work of Donna Haraway (“emergent naturecultures”), Isabelle 
Stengers (“emergence as ecology of practices”), Felix Guattari (“chaosmosis” and 
“ecosophy”), and Michel Serres (“the parasite”) in the field of history and philosophy of 
science. Their respective concepts serve as conceptual models with which to recursively 
examine the nature of co-constitution and coevolution of ideas and biological forms. I believe 
the notion of emergence and its emphasis on process creates new and unexpected synergies 
with Bateson’s key premises of metacommunication, the dynamics of ecological crisis, and 
cybernetic explanation.  
The second chapter entitled “The Necessary Existence of Residues,” continues to examine 
the communicational problem of intersubjective perception and knowledge by scrutinizing 
the pathologization of the “residual class” of the ‘mentally ill’ (i.e. the schizophrenic, the 
borderline, the alcoholic.) I elaborate Bateson’s double-bind theory at length to explore its 
formal boundaries, and to approach its therapeutic potential as emergent within the patient-
therapeutic relationship. At the interface of patient narratives and systematized theories of 
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psychotherapy is the utmost importance of the relationship that binds the patient to the 
potential for new realities, and the doctor to interruptions in their clinical belief systems. I 
draw heavily from renowned psychotherapist Frieda Fromm-Reichmann’s primary clinical 
method of constructing therapeutic double-binds, as well as Henry Stack Sullivan, Erving 
Goffman, and Felix Guattari to explore notions of “interpersonality” (or lack thereof) in the 
phenomenological realities within the asylum. Furthermore, I rely on Michel Foucault’s key 
premise of “psychiatric power” to scrutinize the violence of normativity and stigmatization, 
rooted in the very process of delineating the structures of communicational complexity 
within the psychiatric context. I conclude this chapter with an elaboration of Bateson’s notion 
of “transcontextuality” that emerges precisely at the moment that the double-bind and 
psychotherapeutics is considered not as a specialized medical science, but as a field of 
studying communicational complexity and logical typing.  
My final chapter “Searching for Resonance Amidst the Noise” curls inwards and returns to 
the central problem of mutual understanding in the construction of the particular 
epistemological presuppositions as informed by these various thinkers from a different 
vantage point. I explore the meaning of Bateson’s famous and enigmatic (famously 
enigmatic?) phrase “the patterns that connect” to postulate the topology of ‘resonance’ in 
critical theoretical thinking in particular and ‘mental process’ (in the Batesonian sense) in 
general. I refer to Anthony Wilden’s interdisciplinary continuation of Bateson’s key 
cybernetic premises to elaborate the meaning and stakes of resonance as directly relevant to 
the economy of flexibility in our ideas in a given social system. I conclude with an 
experimental modelling of the theorist (the scientist, the patient, the polymath thinker) as an 
observer-participant, in which experiencing the complexity and beauty of chaos in living 
systems begins as a recursive process of recognizing those same qualities immanent in 
oneself. The process of observing, inspecting, and scrutinizing some external ‘thing’ in the 
world cannot be separated from the process of participating, witnessing, and recalibrating 
that immanent system one is constituted by.  
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I am indebted to Gregory Bateson’s lifelong work from the basic level of structure, as I begin 
each chapter with a short “metalogue” in hopes to frame and introduce the central premises 
of each section. I am reluctant to determine the identities of each of the participating 
protagonists, precisely because I believe the strength of the metalogue form lies in its ability 
to not take a notion of (auto)biographical factuality very seriously. Nonetheless, these 
metalogues were written from a profoundly personal place, with frantic efforts not to let their 
potential resonances become confined to those that were intended by the author. That is the 
main promise of resonance after all—to become open towards and fluent in fascinating 
accidents, in the turbulence of unanticipated connections. This flexibility is embedded in 
Bateson’s original description of a metalogue as a literary exercise on “some problematic 
subject,” where a dialectical unfolding of distinct positions are presented, but are not fixed. 
The thoughts, logic, and language of the players evolve to adapt to the shifting context of 
their interaction; meaning, if it exists, must be embedded in the immanent dialogic or 
relational form itself. This is the ‘meta’ nature of the metalogue, for this form presupposes 
that higher orders of learning are determined not by the content but by the shape of the 
context in which the learning occurs. 
Student, analysand, daughter; teacher, analyst, parent—the fact of participating in a natural 
progression of life anticipates an ongoing plurality in and concurrence of these potentials. I 
am not one but many, with so much depending on who else I am met with in relations of 
flexible reversibility. Within a metalogue, the participants on both sides of the dialogue 
realize that they are functions of their contexts, determined by it even when they are trying to 
resist it. And yet, something new still seems to be emerging out of their encounter with each 
other. They can (somewhat) coherently converse with one another about these matters, in 
spite of the fact that they are both essentially emanations or abstracts or parts of their very 
different social contexts. Perhaps this can be taken as a wider metaphor for the ‘purpose’ of 
my thesis project, which attempts to situate the theoretical findings of different thinkers 
regardless of discipline or historical/genealogical tradition as participating together in one 
resonating system. Furthermore, I believe this metaphor can extend to this academic context 
here right now, where we are sharing ideas in a space that may resonate close or far, that 
x
might actively do harm or actually be helpful or be absolutely useless in the material 
world. It beckons us as academics to critically, thoroughly and ardently participate in the 
larger context of this present moment of chaos and crisis at political, social and ecological 
levels. It is my sincerest belief that every part of our premises and products must refer back 
to the living complexity of the world that we coinhabit with unknown others, and that begins 
with an explicit recognition and involvement of our relations with each other across the 
arguably arbitrary boundaries of specialized fields of study. I can only hope that my tripartite 
search for a new paradigm may allow for the resonances necessary for such inward-looking 
mobilization and change.  
xi
1
1. Epistemic Precarity and Processual E(mergence) 
« Metalogue: Who am I to you? Who are you to me? » 
Student: Do you see what I mean? 
Teacher: What do you mean? 
 
S: Never mind. 
T: Are you asking if I can ‘see’ exactly how you ‘think’? How I evaluate the messages 
you intend to give me will always remain on my side of a gulf between us. I am inclined 
to think that neither of us are particularly interested in elaborating our differences for the 
sake of reinforcing their antagonisms or irreversibilities. Maybe your question can lead to 
an interchange right now, right here—not about the ‘things’ we talk about, but the 
additional messages that are embedded in those messages about what is going on between 
us. 
S: We all seem to go about our lives mired in miscommunication and distorted 
relationships, in the academic dungeon we both occupy and at every instance of our 
respective everyday lives. You taught me about the importance of precision in my usage 
of words, of instantiating communicative nodes at larger (higher?) scales of 
communication about communication to form bridges between differences. This bridging 
does not always lead to agreement, but may begin as a process of finding some sort of 
common-ground. Yet I am left profoundly confused and frustrated at how we can talk 
about interdisciplinary complexity and transcontextuality in our thought processes and 
imagined futures when I cannot wholly understand your ideas and you cannot fully grasp 
where I am coming from, in my concepts and my embodiment.
T: What you are proposing is a problem of communication in general, emergent in any 
moment of interactive and intersubjective encounter. 
2
S: Where do we go from there? How does anything get done at all when we cannot even 
agree on the resonances of single words we use?1
T: You rush into asking the question of ‘doing’ (accomplishing, acting, achieving, 
exploiting). Neither of us are quixotic enough to think that perfect understanding can 
change the shape of things as they are, or that it is ‘literally’ achievable. Metaphors do not 
mould materials or make new men out of old; they can only provide a sense of direction. 
S: And the ‘great achievement’ of providing this sense of direction, a mapping of the 
processual patterning of ideas, may be the overcoming of the great preference we give to 
the monomial drive to ‘do’ —the literal, measurable, great achievements of purposive 
(non)thinking. 
T: Sure. The first step would be to make ‘my’ mental ecology apparent to ‘yours,’ in 
hopes that we will find ways to relate to our shared social ecology in a way that is non-
exploitative, and perhaps even creative. No such ‘doing’ occurs here, our shared space 
silent enough to allow new emergences.
S: So what about the work of theorists and their playtime with their favourite words? So 
many of them still talk as if they should or even could productively produce such plans 
for the generality (and specificity) of humans on earth. We need to talk about scale. 
T: It is brilliantly easy to be (intentionally) unaware of how ideas, the skein of scientific-
aesthetic descriptions and associations calcifies into purposes, functions, laws and 
constants. I do not think it is a coincidence that Felix Guattari called this a process of 
“semiotisation”: the perceived stability of words operate behind a veneer so that any sort 
of mode of chaotic discomfort, including relations of recursivity and radical alterity, can 
be neatly packaged into digestible, hermetically sealed equivalences.  We cannot equate 2
the process of nourishment and nurturing to the task of measuring pre-portioned meals. 
 An extensive bulk of this thesis project is an ongoing return to this question. 1
 Felix Guattari, Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Bloomington 2
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 85. 
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The neoliberal myth of the world market offers a misleading notion of singular 
systemization, by which subjects and their economies vegetate into a state of stasis and 
uniformity. So much depends on imagining, and therefore inhabiting otherwise. 
S: So can our words, or more precisely the relations between words, excite and mobilize 
these states of homeostasis that may have become rigid and complacent? Can words 
remind us of the fluctuating, precarious, circuitous and potentially creative nature of 
living process in general? 
T: Maybe. That is your task, one I can be an interlocutor for. But for now, perhaps our 
shared task is to generate moments of turbulence, and thereby reflective space to 
exchange words and food about the state of words and food—who buys what, what is 
allowed for what purpose, and so on. I believe such an exploration entails articulating 
between ecologies that are described as mental, political, economic, environmental, 
scientific, and so on. This would then account for how such modes of articulation come 
across their own categorizing and categorizational limits in their very process. But that is 
just a single vocality, mine—that can perhaps be juxtaposed with other vocalities.
S: I remember mentions of ecological crisis, racism, global warfare, and various other 
epiphenomena of homogenizing, epistemologically erroneous collective practices 
emerging in our shared classroom. These considerations were necessary, for disaster was 
and is an immanent presence. Matters pertaining to ‘what is going on’ in our own heads 
and between our heads in that classroom, and the collective affairs ‘outside,’ were so 
tightly woven together— 
T: —perhaps that is ‘mental process.’ The unity of mind and nature.
S: So the premise I wish to emphasize, and which I believe to be of the most immediate 
and relevant necessity to our contemporary moment, is the notion that the systemic 
shortsightedness of our conscious purpose, and all-pervasive forms of reductivism and 
the epiphenomena of the mind-body dichotomy, could perhaps be helped mitigated or 
avoided by a serious consideration of mental processes that are not quick to solve 
4
problems but attempt to find resonances between things. This would include doing the 
labour of following a long and tedious path of computing all the relations between 
relevant variables. The resonance might then invite the labour of theorizing about labour 
as a product of mental process in its own right. 
T: Like I have mentioned again and again, this is a question of scale, or the question of 
metrics, precisely what I think remains as the forefront problem. 
S: Help me through with this, one more time. 
T: I think I am saying what you have just articulated, but with different words. There is 
always a scalar difference or a varying metric that goes along with the content of what is 
being taught. That is, there are orders of learning at meta-levels and meta-meta levels, 
and so on, that examine not the transmission of x or y to the learner, but the learner’s 
implications for character, about what sort of world the learner thinks she is living in, 
about what sort of world the relationship between her and peers and her teacher emerges 
from, about how her central ‘findings’ relate back to the variegated, perplexing, and often 
violent world she is living in, and so on. The resonances of words that are closest in 
meaning across languages do not have the same connotations or resonances in the other 
language.This is the problem of translation: the often arduous and convoluted task of 
finding resonances between distinct languages and ways of being, enveloped in the 
beautiful compulsion to be as precise and true as humanly possible. 
S: And what about the body as frantically in-between the gaps of translation... The body 
allows for the exploration of radical intertwinement and relationality. It is the locus of 
susceptibility to the world, yet that exposure inevitably punctures gaps of vulnerability 
with which to relate to another, which threatens to injure and ache. The looming 
possibility of exploitation, the economy of punitive power which is identitarian in nature, 
seeks to muddle everything we have talked about here. 
T: Each variation of the question, different but related to the underlying pattern, is, and 
perhaps must be susceptible to our consideration. What we are compelled to recognize is 
5
that each and every one of us is a living organism, with all the structures and punctures 
and patternings of a living organism. What I am trying to say is that this encounter 
between us, this attempt to ask questions of compounded constitutionality, is a process of 
emergent learning to ‘be’ alongside what appears to you outside and what is apparent to 
you within. And this may be the ‘great achievement' of our words: “To compare one form 
with another, when one of the forms is us.”3
S: At the end of the day, have we silently agreed on something or will we loudly disagree 
on it together?  
T: Perhaps neither, or both, all at once. 
 
S: What will I do when you are no longer here? 
 
T: Sift through the words you have read again and again. They are written on your skin. 
S: ...  
“And last, there is death. It is understandable that, in a civilization which separates mind 
from body, we should either try to forget death or to make mythologies about the survival 
of transcendent mind. But if mind is immanent not only in those pathways of information 
which are located inside the body but also in external pathways, then death takes on a 
different aspect. The individual nexus of pathways which I call "me" is no longer so 
precious because that nexus is only part of a larger mind. The ideas which seemed to be 
uniquely me can also become immanent in you. May they survive—if true.”  4
 Stephen Machmanovitch, The Art of Is: Improvising As a Way of Life (Novato, CA: New World Library, 3
2019), 157. 
 Gregory Bateson, “Form, Substance, and Difference,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: Chandler 4
Pub. Co., 1972), 471.
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« i. Emergence: living with frantic liminality » 
They cannot be talked about (digitalized) at all, whereas they can certainly be (and in 
fact always are) communicated.  
Anthony Wilden  5
A science in conflict with the language of its own investigations is an absurdity.  
Walter Benjamin  6
I would like to begin where Gregory Bateson ended in his “Last Lecture,” written and 
delivered in the fall of 1979. In one of his last recorded written works, Bateson reflects 
upon the varied and potholed trajectory of his career, the search patterns he has diligently 
followed as a lifelong student of life. From his fieldwork in New Guinea as a freshly 
graduated 23 year old scientist, to his traumatic participation in World War II as an 
information analyst, to his last days as onsite elder at the Esalen Institute, movement of 
context and environment was a necessary requirement for him to articulate the kind of 
questions that had remained salient to him up to death. These were namely the 
relationships between ecosystem and metasystem, mind and body, form and substance, 
entropy and inflexibility, complexity and chaos, all the while attempting to understand 
where the individual (her ideas, desires, quirks and precarities) ‘fits’ into this larger 
scientific and aesthetic picture. Bateson, therefore, studied the isomorphic organizations 
between the processes of evolution and the processes of epistemological development. He 
believed because everything that is worth ‘speaking’ about in the living world is muddled 
by everyday language hiding the truth of its own radical relationality, there emerges a 
paradox of epistemology at the very base root of what he called 'Anglo-Saxon occidental 
culture,’ or perhaps what Donna Haraway calls “‘White Capitalist Patriarchy (how may 
 Anthony Wilden, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange (London: Tavistock 5
Publications, 1972), 40. 
 Walter Benjamin, “Epistemo-Critical Prologue,” The Origin of the German Trauerspiel, trans. John Osborne 6
(London/NewYork: Verso, 1998), 42. 
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we name this scandalous Thing?)”  A favourite story of his to illustrate this picture 7
features him asking a student how many fingers he has, to which he answers, “Five.” 
Bateson believes this to be an incorrect answer, the correct one being some variation of 
“Gregory, you are asking a question wrongly”—for in the evolutionary emergence of 
patterns and organization, “there is surely no word which means finger, and no word 
which means five.”  Industrial capitalism and its ‘intellectual’ enterprises asks only how 8
many fingers are a result of their relating, yet evolutionary process asks how many 
relations did it take to make a hand. There are only the relations between pairs of fingers 
that can account for any attempt to quantify the existence of fingers; the scientist open to 
life, therefore, must count not the items of relation that are related, but the relationships.  
Further on, Bateson writes: “It is not a new idea that living things have immanent beauty, 
but it is revolutionary to assert, as  a  scientist, that matters of beauty are really highly 
formal, very real, and crucial to the entire political and ethical system in which we live.”  9
If anything worth knowing about the self or the other or the world exists in a tangle of 
relationships, the scientist must learn to navigate such tangles, in fact to see them as 
entanglements that are not irredeemable. The biological epistemology, or the cybernetic 
promise at the crux of Bateson’s way of seeing asks to see things not as things (supported 
by a flawed language), but as interlocked patterns of relationships (its radical systemicity) 
that are an immanent determinant of growth of such systems. In Batesonian cybernetic 
explanation (contra the mechanistic conscious purpose of Norbert Weiner and the ‘hard’ 
strain of first-order cybernetics that Bateson eventually distanced himself from), it is not 
a question of why x or y happened, but a question of what constraints operated so that x 
or y, or anything at all, didn’t happen. When Bateson appeals to the notion of immanent 
beauty in the social and mental ecology of systemic forms, he is attempting to make 
appear the synchronic (or paradigmatic) aspect of cybernetic explanation: in other words, 
Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 7
Perspective,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn 1988), 592. 
Gregory Bateson, “Last Lecture,” A Sacred Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind, ed. Rodney E. 8
Donaldson (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 310. 
Ibid., 311. 9
8
how a level of organization of a system operates as commentary on the content of another 
level of organization. At the same time, perhaps paradoxically, this explanation is also 
diachronic—insofar as the description of one developmental pathway at a particular scale 
remains latched in evolutive process by way of and through its movement to another. The 
world that would appear, at the scale of my own body and outwards, may perhaps be 
beautiful—precisely because of the taut paradox of ‘both-and’ mobilizing structural and 
metacommunicative process. In Isabelle Stengers’ words: “The ‘and…or’ does not 
impose abandoning a possibility. It brings about a new kind of appetite—appetite for the 
‘field’ as speculatively implied by the possibility of emergence, a field where both the 
emergent’s requisites and the finalities that will be attributed the utmost be actualized.”   10
  
The premise of emergence is the label, no matter how unsteady, that many scientists and 
thinkers have given to the “highly formal, real, and crucial” matter of beauty in scientific 
enquiry after Bateson’s time. To speak directly of emergence in scientific fields entails an 
acceptance of interrelationality as an indispensable premise of scrutiny, beneath and 
beyond the question of how to identify and describe. A scientific process and praxis 
forthwith in addressing emergence as an urgent concern within the coordinates of its 
discipline can be said to be open to the possibilities of cybernetic (non)logics, of the 
dissipative coherences of bifurcating systems—perhaps towards the ethical and aesthetic 
conception of beauty that Bateson was concerned with throughout his life. At the same 
time, emergence entails an active willingness to grapple with the epistemological 
precarity consistently present throughout the process of defining the framework within 
which this beauty may appear. An encounter with the problem and possibility of 
emergence in scientific enquiry—in mental process in general—is conjoined with another 
encounter, the scale of assumed power of knowledge occupying the discipline, vastly 
disproportionate to the matters of complexity, (neg)entropy, and fractal entanglement in 
question.  
 Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics II, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis and London: University of 10
Minnesota Press, 2003), 228. 
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Yet a science of emergent possibilities, of resonance, is a discursive confrontation with its 
own potentiality to be rigidly bound to such discursive confrontations. To conceive of the 
question of epistemology solely as a punitive agent for the imperialism of mechanistic 
rationality, or to accept the question of disciplinary/bureaucratic power as the only way to 
define epistemic outlines in need of illumination, is to restrict the definition of emergence 
simply in terms of transactional, reductive confrontation. The stakes of this confrontation 
would simply be rhetorical, its operational epiphenomena absent in the territory of the 
laboratory, the society, or the individual life of the implicated organism. The potential for 
the constructive practice of emergence, then, is embedded in the processual development 
of singular scientific ‘findings’ with their paradigmatic blueprints and databooks, as well 
as the appositeness of these ‘findings’ as ‘applied’ in the texture of positioned and non-
sovereign, enmeshed and precarious lives. Emergence, at best, may assist in accounting 
for the difference (that makes a difference) between the number of fingers, the number of 
relationships between the fingers, and the co-constituted and coevolutionary history of 
the formal structure of the human hand, all compounding to disclose a way of perceiving 
and approaching the questions conducive to an understanding of life.  
  
Bateson playfully called such questions conducive to understanding life as constituting 
“the Riddle of the Sphinx,” to which he had “devoted fifty years of professional life as an 
anthropologist.”  A riddle of the Sphinx, for Bateson, is ‘simply’ a question of death and 11
life: within the frame of the riddle, one must balance the context as well as the knowledge 
of oneself as such to arrive at a negotiable outcome. The paradox of simplicity resonates 
in its mythical roots: when Oedipus encountered the Greek sphinx, he was asked a riddle: 
“What speaks with one voice, yet in the morning walks on four legs, walks at noon on 
two legs and in the evening walks on three legs?” Oedipus was the only individual to 
answer correctly: “Man.” Upon hearing her riddle solved with irreverent simplicity, the 
sphinx was livid and tormented, and threw herself to the rocks below her to die. Such a 
simple answer to her enigmatic question was cause for affective disturbances enough to 
Gregory Bateson, "Innocence and Experience" in Angels Fear: An Epistemology of the Sacred (Bantom 11
Books, 1988), 178.
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kill a mythical creature, and the cyberneticist would partake in her misery. As Alfred 
North Whitehead says: “The aim of science is to seek the simplest explanations of 
complex facts. We are apt to fall into the error of thinking that the facts are simple 
because simplicity is the goal of our quest. The guiding motto in the life of every natural 
philosopher would be, ‘Seek simplicity and distrust it.’”  ‘Simply’ put, the riddle 12
traumatizes the player by death and finitude – finitude of and as life, within the infinite 
permutations of a concurrence of outcomes. Anything can happen within the riddle, 
including the violent, (albeit efficient) reduction of its own premises.   
Questions of life and death were not unfamiliar to Bateson. His oldest brother, John, was 
killed in the frontlines of the first World War, and his second brother, Martin, committed 
suicide after a traumatic heartbreak when he was 22. Gregory himself was traumatized by 
war experience: he had come to America with then-wife Margaret Mead in the 1930’s 
only to abruptly return to Britain to serve in the war. When he was told they did not have 
any use for an anthropologist, he sailed back to the United States and spent the war in the 
Pacific working for the OSS, the parent organization of what is now the CIA.  He 13
worked as an information analyst involved in psychological warfare and disinformation, 
in effect contributing to the war with his understanding on the nature of communication 
and cultural exchange. Although he deeply believed in the importance of defeating the 
Axis powers, the act of deliberately distorting communication for instrumental means 
was something that inflicted much pain on him. The steady realization that his own work 
in cybernetics and communications theory was being applied to feed the war machine 
cultivated in him a general disillusionment in applied science, which informed his career 
 Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature: The Tarner Lectures Delivered at Trinity College November 12
1919 (Echo Library, 2006), 163. 
Mary Catherine Bateson, “The Double Bind: Pathology and Creativity,” Cybernetics and Human Knowing: a 13
journal of second-order cybernetics, autopoiesis and cyber-semiotics, vol. 12, no. 1-2: (2005), 13. 
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and personal decisions for the rest of his life —perhaps as a ‘quiet maverick’ of sorts. By 14
lived experience, Bateson’s questions of life and death, then, approach questions of how 
you know what you think you know, questions of cause and effect, how what you know 
‘translates’ in the material world. The questions conductive to an understanding of life, 
then are questions of (mis) translation, of trauma and violence, as much as questions of 
relationship and difference. 
In the second half of Cosmopolitics, Isabelle Stengers designates the concept of 
emergence as a rhetorical challenge of scientists to explain the totality of a phenomenon 
as an emergent whole, the totality being a sum of the parts as the conditions of its 
analysis. In order to arrive at coherent grasping of a phenomenon, that is, to master its 
unravelling processes as objects of inquiry, emergence becomes inappropriately 
instrumentalized as a tool for analytic rigour. Indeed, the constructive potential for 
emergence lies in “the obligation [of science] to recognize the powerlessness of analytic 
thought”: emergence must strive to emerge from its initial polemical history/context, its 
conceptual origins as forged to interrupt the reductionist bias of 19th century science.  15
Stengers defines emergence as a practice of articulating that which is inarticulable by 
purposive, object and objectivity-oriented explanation—not of the objects implicated in 
exchange, but of the imbroglio of relationship that binds them into encounter. In 
Batesonian terms, we would be able to say that emergence is always partaking in a 
 Consider Deleuze and Guattari’s mythologization of Bateson as the barefoot scientist wandering into mid-14
century chaos, although they—perhaps deliberately—muddle the chronological order of biographical events 
(i.e. Bateson’s participation in the American military prefaced his work with schizophrenia and dolphins). : 
Deleuze and Guattari may simply assume chronology does not alter and interact with the content of Bateson’s 
work, as though these ‘steps towards an ecology of mind’ were co-existent. This is a prevalent and insidious in 
humanities scholarship, for it is a reductionism that excludes the possibility of emergence. “Let us consider the 
more striking example of a career a I'americaine, with abrupt mutations, just as we imagine such a career to be: 
Gregory Bateson begins by fleeing the civilized world, by becoming an ethnologist and following the primitive 
codes and the savage flows; then he turns in the direction of flows that are more and more decoded, those of 
schizophrenia, from which he extracts an interesting psychoanalytic theory; then, still in search of a beyond, of 
another wall to break through, he turns to dolphins, to the language of dolphins, to flows that are even stranger 
and more deterritorialized. But where does the dolphin flux end, if not with the basic research projects of the 
American army, which brings us back to preparations for war and to the absorption of surplus value.”  
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark 
Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 238. 
 Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics II, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis and London: University of 15
Minnesota Press, 2003), 209.
12
metacommunicative grappling with its own contrasting levels of abstraction. What is at 
stake is the implicit nature of metalinguistic and metacommunicative messages in any 
attempt to explain and encounter other communicational organisms-systems.  16
Metacommunication is communication about the quality or mood of communication 
between the speakers; i.e. it is communication about the nature of relationship between 
the speakers. Bateson writes: “The ability to communicate about communication, to 
comment upon the meaningful actions of oneself and others, is essential for successful 
social intercourse. In any normal relationship there is a constant interchange of 
metacommunicative messages such as “What do you mean?” or “Why did you do that?” 
or “Are you kidding me?” and so on. To discriminate accurately what people are really 
expressing, we must be able to comment directly or indirectly on that expression. This 
metacommunicative level the schizophrenic seems unable to use successfully.”  To 17
muddle up these orders or levels of communication, to make explicit what must remain 
implicit or vice versa, is to mistake the scalar specificity of one kind of message for 
another. This causes (schizophrenic) pathologies in communication that can be 
detrimental for the individual at the scale of their body, and the system at various scales 
of its body. 
Stengers, however, is consistently wary of the problem of emergence as a convenient tool 
in the contexts of the sciences, as a way of ensuring that the findings that have ‘emerged’ 
are symmetrical to their search patterns and applicable ‘for’ the world at large. It becomes 
a matter of relevance to mention that Cosmopolitics as an epistemological project 
emerged from Stengers’ continuation of the work of Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, 
 Bateson drew from Russell and Whitehead’s work in Principia Mathematica (1910), particularly in their 16
theory of logical types to understand that communication (various contexts, genetics, learning, psychological 
frames, etc) is a matter of scale. The difference between message, metaliguistic message, and 
metacommunicative message is differentiated by Bateson’s go-to example of the cat on the mat. What is 
explicitly verbalized (digitalized) is the statement “The cat is on the mat.” On a more abstract level, the 
metalingujsitic message could be something like “The verbal sound ‘cat’ stands for any member of such and 
such class of objects.” On an even more abstract level, the metacommunicative message could be something like 
“By telling you where to find the cat, I meant to tell you solidify a common basis of understanding between you 
and me.”)
Gregory Bateson, “Towards a Theory of Schizophrenia,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: 17
Chandler Pub. Co., 1972), 215-216. 
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Alfred North Whitehead, and Gilles Deleuze in scrutinizing the pretensions of science to 
contemporary society as well as notions of objectivity, rationality, and truth. Her 
contemporary participation in a resonating system shared with the likes of Michel Serres, 
Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, and Vincent Despret furthermore instantiates the 
movement of her larger theoretical endeavour towards a notion of “an ecology of 
practices.” Stengers’ “ecology of practices” offers not a list of solutions to tackle global 
crisis, but undertakes a process of learning “the creation of new ways of resisting, in the 
present, a future that derives its plausibility from our powerlessness as well as from 
effective power relationships through which that future is established.”  The 18
metacommunicational dynamics of emergence, then, attests to its own directionality as 
being “never ‘passively’ asked, [but] always actively asked,” an ongoing articulation of 
relationship between neuronal or monadic entities, as well as the ways of experience they 
compound towards.  Perhaps this can be ‘applied’ back to the trajectory of philosophers 19
in science, as well as the academic playgrounds labeled ‘posthumanism’ and ‘new 
materialism’ that seem to operate under the premise that the repetition of articulations, of 
entertaining and embracing redundancies in their ‘findings,’ may in itself be a form of an 
recurrent and ongoing polyphony. The promise of emergence entails the presence of an 
unremitting eros in articulating and rearticulating the ethical and aesthetic question of 
mutual participation in relationship: Who are you to me, and who am I to you?  
Distinct but not separate, Donna Haraway coins the term ‘emergent naturecultures’ to 
describe the companionship within interspecies’ relationships as an affective and 
resonating model for radical interdependency in the “Companion Species Manifesto.” 
The epistemological background from which the Manifesto was emergent was developed 
two decades ago in her 1988 seminal essay “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question 
in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Haraway mobilizes a redefinition 
of objectivity, rationality, and scientific rigour to account for the epistemology, 
 Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics II, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis and London: University of 18
Minnesota Press, 2003), 407. 
Ibid., 222.19
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transmission, and politics of “partial” perspectives. The notion of partiality that Haraway 
develops thrives in its seemingly contradictory definitions: a partial perspective connotes 
the workings of preconceived presuppositions restricting one’s line of vision, yet to be 
partial to an idea, a position or a living being is to experience affection, care, and 
tenderness to its particular way of being. To love, to be affected by the unknowable other 
at the level of one’s body, shares the same process of emergence as that of understanding 
one’s epistemological framework as embedded in a location—a site of overlapping 
contingencies—that cannot claim totality or universality in its own relevance. I must 
articulate ‘my’ relationship with you in order for me to know of my position in the world 
we co-inhabit together, to begin to know what you mean, and so on, so that we can 
navigate each other’s way of being-here in the emergent natureculture we may call our 
mutual habitat. Haraway does not reject science’s canonical fascination with the question 
of objectivity or rationality yet attempts to redefine its boundaries to emphasize 
multiplicity in loci and positionalities that may concur in a notion of scientific 
knowledge. Science situates, meaning that that the taut paradox of partiality is the 
primary condition for any claim of rational knowledge.  To be objective no longer means 20
(perhaps never meant) indifference and impartiality, but profoundly stained, interwoven 
and injured by the very object of knowledge in question—not as a contained phenomenon 
or raw resource to extract, but as an agentive participant in the shared encounter. A 
position of impartiality still entails occupying a positionality, rooted in a particular 
location and therefore contingent and vulnerable to that which is unexpected and other.  
Haraway’s notion of emergence, then, involves a motley of epistemic approaches that 
include consideration for “process, historicity, difference, specificity, cohabitation, co-
constitution, and contingency,” partaking in an epistemological questioning that is 
necessarily feminist and decolonial— categories which mean, if anything, learning “how 
things work, who is in the action, what might be possible… [to] love each other less 
 Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 20
Perspective,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn 1988), 589. 
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violently.”  Such learning would entail change at the level of epistemology, what 21
Bateson called “a change in how to know about the personality-in-the-world.”  Haraway 22
borrows the term “emergent ontologies” from Helen Verran to describe where the 
epistemological approach—defining the perimeters of scientific inquiry—recursively 
circles to and from.  Epistemology as an emergent practice works towards an enlarged 23
conception of how to be in the world (with others in a shared environment). In other 
words, any investigation into the networks of implicated interrelationality constitutive of 
how we know what we know must include confronting the problems of ‘is’: how things 
are, what an organism is, and how a natureculture works. In a model of processual 
emergence, therefore, ontology and epistemology may be split (in Haraway’s conception 
of a “split” as being conductive to “heterogenous multiplicities that are simultaneously 
salient and incapable of being squashed into isomorphic slots or cumulative lists” ) but it 24
would be erroneous to presume they are separable. My (often deep-seated) beliefs about 
my self, the other, and the world will determine my perceptual possibilities as well as 
how I will act in accordance to them, and my way of perceiving/acting will determine my 
beliefs about perception and being active and alive in the world. The art of dwelling in a 
natureculture is, therefore, a process of learning about (participating in) the emergent 
quality of situated knowledges, the moment (which is never a moment but an extended 
duration of mutual relationality) of discovering together “more livable worlds.” This 
discovery does not disclose anything but the tangible meaningfulness of particular others, 
and perhaps the desire to know how to live with this other that I am coming to know, 
Donna Haraway, “The Companion Species Manifesto,” Manifestly Haraway (Minneapolis: University of 21
Minnesota Press, 2016), 99.
Gregory Bateson, “The Cybernetics of Self,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 22
1972), 313.
Donna Haraway, “The Companion Species Manifesto,” Manifestly Haraway (Minneapolis: University of 23
Minnesota Press, 2016), 99.
Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 24
Perspective,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn 1988), 586.
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which may be called love.  The ‘promise’ of emergent naturecultures, then, lies in its 25
dedication to search for potentialities outside of normative conclusions—to perhaps find 
the reward of beauty more abounding, more eloquent and clarifying than the reward of 
power. 
Both Stengers and Haraway propel their definition of emergence with the reverberating 
premise of mutual definition: in an emergent conception of relationality, wholes and parts 
must recursively negotiate themselves, in a co-constituted process of understanding one’s 
own and the other’s implications. In a sense, there is an inherent pacifism to emergence 
as an epistemological practice; emergence seeks to cease the fraught conflict of 
definitions clashing into each other in a battlefield of mis-claimed authority, the 
reductionist impulse to assign meaning to the other on one’s own terms. Yet this pacifism 
refuses to mutate into inert quietude or discursive stagnation, for it is the appetite of 
emergence (or the emergent appetite) to encounter itself through the relationships it 
enunciates. The constructive potential for emergence appears when the epistemic 
precarities elaborating upon it are compelled to encounter its own latent presuppositions 
othered to themselves, which may be described as an affectively challenging yet 
significant moment of experiencing “the relentless pressure of saying and feeling yes/but, 
both/and.”  The question of science, therefore, becomes one that is localized and 26
embodied in the frantic liminality of living within the oscillating ‘both-and’ of emergent 
possibilities. 
 Haraway defines love as a willingness to “inherit all the conditions of their possibility… to be in love means 25
to be worldly, to be in connection with significant otherness and signifying others, on many scales, in layers of 
local and global, in ramifying webs.”  
Donna Haraway, “The Companion Species Manifesto,” Manifestly Haraway (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016), 172.
Donna Haraway and Cary Wolfe, ”Companions in Conversation,” Manifestly Haraway (Minneapolis: 26
University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 212.
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« ii. The dynamics of ecological (ecosophic) crisis » 
I hold to the presupposition that our loss of the sense of aesthetic unity was, quite simply, 
an epistemological mistake. 
Gregory Bateson  27
By 1968, Bateson was beholden to the hypothesis that a systemically disrupted 
understanding of the effects of our actions (i.e. “a sort of blindness to cybernetic 
circuitry”), called for maladjustments and ruptures in natural and cultural processes to 
pathological degrees.  He called for a conference called “The Effects of Conscious 28
Purpose on Human Adaptation” at Burg Wartenstein in Switzerland in the summer of 
1968, initiating an interchange of positions on how humans think and communicate about
—and make decisions upon—structures of natural systems that require urgent 
understanding.  The question that Bateson posed at Burg Wartenstein was one about 29
epistemological errors, or the ‘hard programming’ of conscious purpose that paves way 
for mass maladjustments in human adaptation within the biosphere. These errors were 
based upon unexamined ‘impulses’ towards problem solving and achievement of goals as 
a culture, i.e. conscious purpose. The central premise by which the conference 
commenced was that the failure of conscious purpose in leading to actions is not just 
connected to, but constitutive of, the failure of the human being to understand the 
 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), 18. 27
Mary Catherine Bateson, Our Own Metaphor (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1972), xi. 28
 Ibid. Those in participation included Warren McCullogh, then-chairman of the Macy Foundation Conference 29
on Cybernetics, Barry Commoner, an American Geothean biologist and politician who contributed to the 
“Information Movement” along with Margaret Mead, Will Jones, a historian of philosophy, Fred Atteneave, a 
psuchologist specializing in the problems of perception, Gordon Pask, a British cyberneticist, Bernie Raxlen, a 
Canadian psychiatrist with anthropological interests, and Horst Mittelstaedt, a German zoologist turned 
cyberneticist and physicist—and Mary Catherine Bateson, anthropologist, Gregory Bateson’s first daughter, and 
author of the book that reports the conference. Here, I must address the question of the credibility of Mary 
Catherine Bateson, at least pertaining to the details of Gregory Bateson’s thinking. She alternates between being 
her father's dialogic interlocutor where both are active participants (i.e. in the collaborative metalogues 
published in Angel’s Fear) and becoming a self-appointed spokesperson for her father when he can no longer 
speak for himself (i.e. as in her essays pertaining to Bateson’s lifelong work and legacy published after his 
death.) While her contributions and adjacent insights to Bateson’s thought are valuable as a secondary source, 
there needs to be some hesitation in wholesale accepting the comments about what she thinks her father might 
have thought. 
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systemic character of the natural world.  That which would ‘correct’ the linear 30
reductivism and pathological belief of power over the environment that seems to spill out 
from normative industrial practices, then, would become a matter of investigating into the 
fractality of emergent possibilities in how we think about the systemic workings of 
global-scale problems and their proposed ‘solutions.’ 
Bateson believed that an idea, if believed in by enough people with enough certainty and 
met with enough technical execution, produces ‘by-products’ in the real, embodied world 
at large—so that those very ideas, whether they demonstrate systemic destruction or 
restoration, are nurtured into the texture of everyday life. To paraphrase his model of 
“Dynamics of Ecological Crisis” (fig. 1): unchecked growth of population, technology, 
and “hubris”— belief in dominance over self, other, and planetary ecology—
interconnects and accelerates into epiphenomena of famine, pollution, and war.  Any 31
attempt to ‘reprogram’ the dynamics of ecological crisis begins with an attempt to correct 
the autocatalytic growth of certain presuppositions about the ecology of nature and, 
therefore, the ecology of self.  Bateson believed this task to be a profoundly aesthetic 
one: it is in some kind of wholeness of aesthetic perception that conscious purpose may 
be ‘steered.’  So much depends upon the ability to conceive of self, other, and 32
environment as systemic entities nested within larger systems, or ‘ecologies of mind.’  33
 Mary Catherine Bateson, “The Double Bind: Pathology and Creativity,” Cybernetics and Human Knowing: a 30
journal of second-order cybernetics, autopoiesis and cyber-semiotics, vol. 12, no. 1-2: (2005), 14. 
Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc. 1982), 498-499. “…the 31
bigger the population, the faster it grows; the more technology we have, the faster the rate of new invention; and 
the more we believe in our ‘power’ over an enemy environment, the more ‘power’ we seem to have and the 
more spiteful the environment seems to be.” 
 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), 110-113. The 32
conductor and the steam engine is a central metaphor for Bateson (borrowing from Alfred Russel Wallace’s 
comparison with the steam engine with a governor and the process of natural selection) and his discussion of 
analogic systems (as opposed to digital systems), or cyclical systems that vary continuously and in accordance 
to the magnitude of ‘fuel’ or ‘energy input’. The angle of the arms of the governor is continuously variable and 
has a continuously variable effect on the fuel supply; in other words, it is in the relationship with the governor’s 
body and the machine that instigates an exchange of information and therefore the dynamism of the system. In 
analogic systems, differences between what happens in one instance of the circuit and events in the next round 
become the crucial factor in the self-corrective process. 
In the cybernetic sense, ‘mind,’ ‘mental process,’ and ‘system’ are interchangeable, and thereby mechanistic to 33
some degree: showing that a system can learn, respond, interpret events, and can self-correct in various ways. 
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The ‘new’ science, then, proposed by the works of cyberneticists and system theorists in 
the twentieth century, was characterized by recognizing the immediate necessity of 
working at a meta-level; that is, an epistemological level that ‘thinks about thinking’ and 
‘inquires about inquiry,’ presenting at the same time the content of what is thought and 
inquired into. The resonating question that Bateson asked himself and his environment 
was: “How does ideas, information, steps of logical or pragmatic consistency, and the like 
fit together? How is logic, the classical procedure for making chains of ideas, related to 
an outside world of things and creatures, parts and wholes? How is the world of logic, 
which eschews ‘circular argument,’ related to a world in which circular trains of 
causation are the rule rather than the exception?”  As of 1979, the date of the publication 34
of Mind and Nature, Bateson confronted the possibility that logic and quantity turn out to 
be inappropriate devices for describing organisms, their interactions and internal 
organization, and that “there is no conventional way of explaining or even describing the 
phenomena of biological organization and human interaction.”  Knowledge becomes 35
indistinguishable from normative conclusions or fragments of presuppositions labelled 
‘common sense’; mental process operates and lives beneath and beyond the products of 
the accepted kernels of know-how of the prevailing paradigm. In cybernetic terms, the 
system (of knowledge) goes into runaway, self-perpetuating and therefore unchanged. 
What is still (wilfully?) unknown is the scientist’s own knowledge of himself. This 
includes his educative moulds, the trajectory of his child and adult experience, the skein 
of his relations with others, etc., that shape and inform presuppositional contexts. 
About three decades later since the time of Bateson’s modelling of ecological crisis, Felix 
Guattari introduced the notion of (schizo)chaosmosis to describe a model or mode of 
perceiving disparate articulations of chaos and complexity in “abstract machines.” This 
modelling occurs first and foremost at the level of our own verbalizations, which in turn 
Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), 19-20.34
 Ibid. A quote that ‘redefines’ art by Theodor Adorno, spoken ten years ago from this moment, transfers and 35
reverberates quite strongly here: “It is self-evident that nothing concerning art [scientific inquiry] is self-evident 
anymore, not its inner life, not its relation to the world, not even its right to exist.”  
(Aesthetic Theory, 1 [1969]) 
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may reroute scientific analysis to consider “revitalizing complexions of alterity and 
rekindling processes of semiotization.”  Trained as a psychotherapist, Guattari observed 36
the members of the ‘mad,’ ‘insane,’ residual class violently and irredeemably reified into 
a class of pathologized strangeness. This led him to scrutinize the constructions of 
subjectivity as plural and polymorphic, first at the scale of the individual mind (the 
“psyche”), then the socio-political/institutional group (the “socius”), and finally the 
ecological system (the environment). Guattari attempted to model the discomfort of chaos 
as an “emergent ontology” of its own, emphasizing the polyphony of chaosmic 
components as a byproduct of some sort of ‘non-obvious’ functional organicity. His 
ethico-aesthetic processual paradigm attempts to nurture radical alterity as a way of 
refounding political praxis—an alterity that is “grasped at the point of its emergence—
non-xenophobic, non-racist, non-phallocratic—intense and processual becomings, a new 
love of the unknown…"  Such a political and ethical project required an immanent 37
embrace of the process of emergent enunciation (enunciative emergence?) in the social 
and mental ecologies of those implicated, which in turn provides the epistemological 
flexibility or processual creativity required to see the polyvocality of chaosmic alterity. 
Guattari instantiates a process of ethical depathologization: that is, to privilege and not 
efface the “the emergent fractality of the Unconscious,” and thereby actively working to 
construct new assemblages of therapeutic listening and metamodelization at an ecological 
scale.  38
At the end of Chaosmosis: an ethico-aeshetic paradigm, Guattari inaugurates the figure 
of the ecosophic subject to articulate the task at hand: technoscience must bolster 
processual emergence as an urgent conductor for creativity, which in turn may catalyze a 
sense of ontological responsibility in accordance of which the infrastructure of science 
 Felix Guattari, Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Bloomington 36
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 85. The notion of an “abstract machine” delineates the 
quality of frantic liminality that I have attempted to describe throughout the first section of this chapter. Guattari 
writes: “The machine, every species of machine, is always at the junction of the finite and infinite, at this point 
of negotiation between complexity and chaos.” (111)
Ibid., 117. My emphasis.37
 Ibid., 64.38
21
and technology must be built. The chaosmic process of an ecosophy requires us to 
consider the implications of logos in the term ecology itself, which includes the process 
of “articulating between scientific, political, environmental, and mental ecologies”—a 
rearticulation of Bateson’s notion of “transcontextuality” as explored in my next 
chapter.  The ecosophic subject speaks of “machines rather than drives, Fluxes rather 39
than libido, existential Territories rather than the instances of the self and of transference, 
incorporeal Universes rather than unconscious complexes and sublimation, chaosmic 
entities rather than signifiers—[which] may not simply be a matter of vocabulary!”  The 40
ecosophic subject would know of Bateson’s dynamics of ecological crisis as a general 
crisis of the global system, constitutive also of particular crises of social, political, 
psychological, existential means. They would be able to identify the paradigmatic 
inheritances of abusive normativities, propelling them to replace the rigid immobility of 
and between disciplines/sectors with hinging and synthesizing interpolations.  
In Mind and Nature, Bateson begins by outlining his own presuppositions, the 
epistemological context from which he is writing his last book. The first presupposition 
Bateson considers ‘every schoolboy [ecosophic subject] knows’ is that “Science never 
proves anything.”  Science is an unending testing and re-testing of propositions that may 41
“improve hypotheses and sometimes disproves them,” but through which a ‘discovery’ of 
truth or an eternal verity cannot be ‘found.’  In other words, science is an emergent 42
frame placed around a subject of inquiry or object of examination. It is a mode of 
perception, a contingent map constructed to navigate the world of natural phenomena 
‘on-the-territory.’ Articulated through Guattarian vocabulary, one could say that science 
does not exhibit objective fact but “rebounds and irrupts on the states of things… 
 Ibid., 134. 39
Ibid., 126. 40
 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), 27.41
 Carl Gustav Jung, “Septem Sermones ad Mortuos”, trans. H. G. Baynes (The Gnostics Society Library, online 42
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[performing a] confrontation with heterogeneous states of complexity”—which allows 
for an emergent enunciation of an ethical and aesthetic paradigm.   43
Furthermore, Bateson borrows from Carl Jung (who borrowed from the Alexandrian 
Gnostics of the 2nd century A.D.) to make the distinction of Pleroma, a billiard ball 
model of the world determined by pure physicality, where the mechanical forces of cause 
and effect render distinctions meaningless; and Creatura, the world governed precisely 
by distinction and difference, within which organisms with sensory end organs respond to 
difference and signal messages in turn.  Pleroma is a world without descriptive 44
propositions—in that the set of descriptive propositions to describe its physical causes 
and ‘events’ produces a vocabulary and syntax of ‘pure’ materialist epistemology. In 
other words, if we were to make ‘maps’ (i.e. scientific hypotheses, art objects, any 
product of knowledge and perception) strictly in Pleroma, process would be determined 
as a mechanical thing; perception, thought, and social interaction—the mental—are 
reduced to matters of the material. The territory then gets further and further obscured. 
What is said about Pleroma is ‘condemned’ to eternally be a matter of speculation, for 
Pleromatic ‘thinking’ without Creatural process operates as a kind of Alexander’s sword, 
chopping its way into a solution, dividing, forcing, and bartering away the pieces of the 
problem. There is a brute violence, expedience at the cost of complexity, to the illusion 
that Pleroma is what is said about it. As Jung writes: “When we distinguish qualities of 
the pleroma, we are speaking from the ground of our own distinctiveness and concerning 
our own distinctiveness.”  We create what we already know, and what we already know 45
never equates to the territory. We make distinctions in our descriptions of it, but that 
process itself, language, can only happen in Creatura. For communication and perception
—and therefore science—to even remotely happen, an ‘epistemological turn,’ so to 
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speak, must occur to conceive of a way of perceiving and relating the simultaneity of 
Creatura and Pleroma to oneself, and perhaps to another. The connectedness and 
concurrence of Creatura and Pleroma (i.e. Creatura and Pleroma as parts of a recursive 
system) is what Bateson began to call mental process or mind, which he believed 
accounted for matters of communication, biological evolution, play and learning, and art. 
The sense organ or the device that receives information is indeed ‘material’, but its 
responsivity, its ability to understand a message and compose one in return, must be 
distinguished as ‘mental’.  
Bateson believed that an aesthetic inquiry was required, placed in between or as 
mediating theory and practice. Truth about what can be perceived, or arrived at by 
induction from perception would be “something else again,”  beneath and beyond the 46
compulsion to grasp the independence of things, or in outright attempt to subjugate things 
to another’s passion for utilization. The aesthetic question emerges in the exact moment 
that the question of scientific truth swells and tautens according to polyphonic 
subjectivities and non-normative alterities. In a similar light, Guattari posits “the new 
aesthetic paradigm” as the ecosophic subject’s last remaining habitat, the site of emergent 
creative potentiality at the intersections of all that is contingent, finite, and precarious. In 
his words: “It is in passing though this chaotic ‘earthing,’ this perilous oscillation, that 
something else becomes possible, that ontological bifurcations and the emergence of 
coefficients of processual creativity can occur.”   47
  
For the first-order ‘hard-strain’ cyberneticist who works for and with information, 
however, meaning ‘proves’ to be something else all over again. This is exemplified in the 
conclusion of the well-known cyberneticist Warren McCullogh’s work on the topology of 
 A phrase frequently used by Bateson to suggest a difference in logical type. “Something else again” a delicate 46
way to say we need a new logical type because it refuses to identify what the something else might be.
 Felix Guattari, Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Bloomington 47
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 82. 
24
nervous nets in 1945.  Most notable was his postulation of a notion of circularity in 48
cybernetic (nervous) systems, defined in terms of heterarchical ordering. The 
heterarchical oscillations of signal input and transference of information within the 
system are characterized by decentralized and multi-levelled patterning. Paraphrased by 
Peter Harris-Jones, McCullogh found that the topology of nervous nets were patterned by 
such multiple nodes of connection occurring among the synapses of the whole nervous 
system—which are, in turn, connected through each of the individual nodes through 
recursive reverberation.  This renders the relation between any nervous input and any 49
outcome from nervous activity starkly non-linear, and the knowledge about what the 
nervous expressions signify highly indeterminate.  McCollugh then admitted that he 50
could not proceed further because the math at the time could not deal with so profound a 
non-linear phenomenon; yet this problem was ‘solved’ a couple of decades later by 
computer technology.  The problem of meaning, however (perhaps closely related to the 51
problem of beauty) remained. The data teemed, grew to proportions inconceivable and 
inaccessible to ‘mind’ at the scale of the human body, but it didn’t mean anything—
meaning that it didn’t have a context to see it within, so as to perceive its role or place in 
its interactions.  
Bateson took on the role or position of reminding his scientific circle of the primacy of 
context in his time; he posited that knowledge about context stems only from a 
methodology that views knowledge in context. In his own words: “Without context, 
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words and actions have no meaning at all. This is true not only of human communication 
in words but also of all communication whatsoever, of all mental process, of all mind, 
including that which tells the sea anemone how to grow and the amoeba what he should 
do next.”  A turn towards a contextual, ecological understanding of the ‘stuff’ of 52
Creatura, matters that are ecologically organized and therefore largely aesthetic, include 
understanding the context of one’s own underlying assumptions and existing paradigm. A 
recursive and non-exploitative science of emergent resonance does not hesitate to make 
the ecosophic commitment of becoming through bifurcations, of recreation through 
rupture. 
« iii. The parasitic promise  » 
How important is it to have a metaphor uniting all the odds and ends of knowledge about trees 
into a whole that can sustain such love? 
Mary Catherine Bateson  53
We eat the bread of our mores; we drink the wine of our culture; we speak only the words of our 
tongue—I am speaking, of course, of unfit people like me. And love, I ask you: what about love 
between two people? Here, then, is the specificity. 
Michel Serres  54
The previous two sections of this chapter were used to simultaneously particularize and 
enlarge the vocabulary with which a ‘new’ science, accepted as a history of the relations 
between ideas, may confront the jagged depths of its own material stakes in a global state 
of precarity. The dyadic model of Creatura and Pleroma often employed by Bateson was 
introduced to emphasize the necessity of movement between (epistemically vulnerable) 
constructed meaning and physical reality, indeed the interface of what we posit as 
perceived-verbalized knowledge and quantifiable materiality. At a meta-level, however, I 
aimed to show the usage of metaphor, of descriptive and abductive modelling in general, 
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as a generative process of its own, a matter of scientific rigour and material importance. 
From here I posit the semantics of Creatura—creatural communication fluent in 
relationships, dependent systemicities, and the tenacious persistence of radical alterity—
as parasitic, as perpetually in-between, informationally chaotic, inevitably specific and 
particular. I rely heavily on Michel Serres’ 1980 seminal text The Parasite to begin such a 
modelling of creatural communication, beginning with his attempt to model the 
biological parasite as intricately intertwined with the social parasite to conceive of noise
—the redundancies of static and interference—as the parasitic characteristic of all 
dynamic and entangled systems. In Serres’ words, “The theory of being, ontology, brings 
us to atoms. The theory of relations brings us to the parasite.”  Furthermore, I concur 55
with Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s assertion that the problem of precarious survival helps us 
see the erroneous premises of the state of the larger system, and that precarity itself “is a 
state of acknowledg[ing] our vulnerability to others.”  I attempt to articulate the model 56
of the parasite at the cusp of both its violent and collaborative potentialities, in order to 
confront the “theory of relations,” epistemology, in our current context of scientific, 
global and ecological precarity. 
Batesonian cybernetic explanation returns again and again to the detrimental dissonance 
between verbal language developed to expediently seize Pleroma, and biological 
communication concerning patterns and relationships. Language, the system of 
articulation developed around nouns referring to things set in subject-predicate relations, 
has been a singularly radical invention for thinking about things,   yet with such an 
invention emerges the capacity for erroneous reification. Bateson repeated throughout his 
life that there are no ‘things’ in Creatura—only ideas, relations between ideas, perceived 
images and maps faintly drawn in pencil. Yet there is a vast power of convenience 
conjoined with the ability to talk as though such ideas and maps—about the biological 
and social world, scientific truth, God, and so on—can be designated as distinct graspable 
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things. Cybernetic explanation begins from recognizing metaphor as communicationally 
coherent with the processual emergence of biological and evolutionary development. 
That is, in metaphor, two propositions are set adjacent and corresponded to one another, 
the affirmative association made via juxtaposed proximity (instead of predication as in 
language). In metaphor, in biological process, it becomes impossible to separate subject 
from predicate within a given proposition. To speak of the world of the living and 
growing (my world, and yours), therefore, what we describe and reference must be met 
with a language that has no things in it but only relations and differences. This language 
of creatural communication would know of the mistreatment of ecological and 
interpersonal complexity latent in its own notion, simultaneously persevering still in 
modelling a critical relationship between epistemology and ethics.   
At the crux of Bateson’s definition of cybernetic language is its commitment to maps or 
rigorous metaphors in order to mobilize a technique of articulating and transferring 
conceptual models across predetermined coordinates. Because mapping can only exist in 
a realm of explanation specific to the mapmaker, that is, because the differentiation 
between the map that is made and the territory that is encountered is embedded in the 
scientist’s very ‘object’ of study, what constitutes cybernetic explanation is a navigation 
of information—namely their redundancies and restraints. The concept of redundancy 
emerges when the mapmaker begins to consider how they could reduce or constrict the 
totality of maximum information in any given instance. Redundancy is employed to 
approach the vast chaos of noise with some sort of navigational understanding informed 
by the “collateral clues” of various patternings. Redundancy, therefore, is the word 
Bateson gives to the negotiating potential of patterning, that which bolsters the 
predictability of subsequent happenings within a larger aggregate of communicational 
events.  Redundancy and error, therefore, can only be a biological phenomenon (i,e., 57
communication is the creation of redundancies and patterning, particularized search 
patterns with which to frame meaning within noise). Bateson writes: “If then we say that 
a message has ‘meaning’ or is ‘about’ some referent, what we mean is that there is a 
Gregory Bateson, “Cybernetic Explanation,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc. 57
1982), 412.
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larger universe of relevance consisting of message-plus-referent, and that redundancy or 
pattern or predictability is introduced into this universe by the message.”  The science of 58
cybernetics during Bateson’s time broached this larger universe of relevance, meaning 
that its own limits could not be experimenting with computers to simulate 
communicational processes. Cybernetics could be situated as the scientific study of noise: 
noise as “the only possible source of new patterns.”  59
Michel Serres designates the parasite as conductor and producer of (physical, acoustic, 
informational”) noise. The parasite, therefore, is the quintessential cybernetic entity, 
iconic of “the essence of relation” and the radical fact of interrelationality when speaking 
of operative life.  Like Bateson, Serres posits that noise is the sustaining presence of 60
overlapping redundancies that may give rise to new patterns and therefore a new system, 
ordered by nodes of complexity at larger scales. Silence is presupposed as a material 
impossibility, for the white noise of the aleatory (the dynamics of entangled relations and 
their residuals) persists in being. It is the parasite that is at once responsible for the 
growth and termination of a system’s complexity, existing in a frantic liminality 
described as "somewhat fractal, complicated in any case, so random that it is an 
individual, so serrated and notched that it is unique.”  The parasite, then, functions as a 61
creatural metaphor, completely and utterly existent because of the existence of relations 
and differences. The parasitic promise of Creatural communication, and perhaps 
Creatural science, is the capacity to incite differential change in the state of whatever 
system is under consideration. “The position of the parasite is to be between [within a 
system]”—so that its state of self-corrective equilibrium (homeostasis) does not atrophy 
into epistemological rigidity, and that its developmental or evolutionary trajectory 
(homeorhesis) does not suffer unchecked growth inflaming its own discernible 
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boundaries.  What makes such processes dynamic is that each organism operates in 62
terms of its own priorities which are irrelevant to the reasons or understandings of the 
other.  If the parasite is opaque to the host (or vice versa), unpredictability emerges—and 
thus possibilities of turbulence into new patterns. 
Serres’ description of the parasite verges away from an identitarian classification of an 
organism: i,e., the parasite as creatural metaphor is not a ‘thing’ but a patterned class of 
knowledge that ventures into radical relationality, performing “not mediation but an 
intermediary… not necessarily useful, except of course for his own survival: this relation 
to the relation allows him to exist.”  The parasite disturbs and interrupts; it is the 63
annexing hinge of definitions prescribed to differently positioned individuals within a 
relational encounter.  The parasite, by the very conditions of its existence, instigates a 
generative disorder between host and intruder, constituter and contaminator, interrupter 
and transformer. It exists only via the relation to the relation between distinct things, for 
the parasite is the ‘site’ of paradoxical and paranormal (paranormative?) excitement.  64
Serres’ parasite is defined under the premise “contamination as collaboration” as posited 
by Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing: the emergent possibility of making othered worlds via 
collaborative entanglement, counting for each instance of specific and uniquely 
positioned encounter. Tsing writes: “Purity is not an option… Collaboration means 
working across difference, which leads to contamination. Without collaborations, we all 
die.”  Furthermore, the parasite offered a reminder that the history of developmental 65
change and biological-epistemological growth—of Creatural process altogether—is a 
history of unhinged contamination. Its being attests to an evolutionary track that is not 
naive or innocent in its epiphenomenal pollutions (i.e., its ongoing history of colonial 
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genocide, ecosytemic exploitation, and other chronic violations of communicative 
networks of all types and scales). 
   
Latent in the imaginary of the parasite is the malicious intent of a habitually exploitative 
agent, and explicit in its definition is the inevitable process of benefitting (surviving) via 
the nutrients of another’s being. In Serres’ words, a parasite “never nourishes its children. 
Otherwise it would be in the position of the host. A parasite defies itself from being 
parasite; the thing is there in all its simplicity.”  The “simplicity” (which according to 66
Whitehead, must always be distrusted) spoken about here is the unrestrictedly self-
corrective quality characteristic of complementary relationships, as distinguished by 
Bateson in his anthropological studies of interpersonal and intergroup dynamics from 
symmetrical patterns of behaviour.  Bateson posited that fundamental to the idea of 67
symmetry in relations is the extension of a notion of mirrored equilibrium, an rivalrous 
oscillation of positive feedback that would make the relationship prone to schismogenic 
(unchecked, runaway) growth. In other words, by identifying the feedback of 
symmetrical patterns as positive, as uninterrupted by parasites of any kind, the system 
would operate faster and faster to facilitate its growth. Insofar as symmetrical patterns 
continue to be unfettered by gaps, divergences, incongruities, it would work towards the 
edge of its own limitations—whether such a disruption to the status quo was desired or 
not. Yet models of complementarity (i.e., “dominance—submission, exhibitionism—
spectatorship, succoring—dependence”), would instigate a coordinated integration where 
the behaviour of x fit in with but was not the same as that of y.  Complementary patterns 68
of behaviour would limit or redirect exponential progressions towards a maintenance of a 
steady state—whether that maintenance of homeostasis was desired or not. The parasite, 
then, is a disruptive, corrective phenomenon that chaotically defies any standard of 
desirability; it is inevitable insofar as it is indifferent to ethical consequence. At the same 
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time, however, the parasite is utterly imbricated in its particular relations, the condition of 
intersubjective irreversibility that allows for its capacity to parasite the other in the first 
place.  
The parasite, then, is a model of intensifying specificity. The parasite enters the body of 
its host in order to infect it with itself, yet the metric of this infectious power is its 
capability to adapt itself to this other, to participate in their shared porosity, to know of 
the other in all of its otherness. This is the paradox of the parasite: it loves insofar that it 
cannot exist without the specificity, the intimacy of this particular, exceptional relation. 
Serres writes: “The position of the parasite is to be between. That is why it must be said 
to be a being or a relation. But the attribute of the parasite, until now not mentioned, is its 
specificity. […] How is it that I love you; you, among a hundred thousand, me, and not 
another? Is it an illusion: is Don Juan’s catalogue a wiser way of doing things?”  The 69
parasite cannot be a viral presence amidst a general mass of hosts; the parasite must enter 
into the proximity of its host other, particularizing the potential randomness or variability 
of the encounter by demanding participatory exchange. Participation (the intimacy of 
differential specificity, the abandonment of individuality and ontological solidity for the 
relation) is part of the parasitic promise, that which excites and endangers steady states of 
information, of kinship, of biological life. Indeed, “How is it that I love you?” could be 
another variation of the Riddle of the Sphinx, a disturbing, yet generative question of 
organic and epistemological viability.  
In a critical examination of coevolutionary processes and coconstitutive companion 
species, Donna Haraway writes that “…love kills, unconditionally, both kinds and 
individuals.”  By occupying both complementary and symmetrical dynamisms of 70
interrelationality, the parasite highlights the problematic fantasies of a perfect, identic 
mutuality in intersubjective encounter. Haraway notes that an ideal of “equality” does not 
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equate and has not ever equated to “the conjoined dance of face-to-face significant 
otherness.”  The history of coconstitutive companionship is always, to some degree, also 71
a history of dominance, domestication, and asymmetrical disparity. Yet perhaps it is the 
primary task of the articulations of science, of any Creatural (inter)discipline, to 
understand and critically reflect upon the fraught state of intersubjectivity as its very 
subject matter. Bateson’s ‘definition’ of love offers such an illustration, of demonstrating 
cybernetic description as a scientist and conducting its unseen and unquantifiable 
resonances outside of the laboratory: 
At least a part of what we mean by the word could be covered by 
saying that ‘I love X” could be spelled out as ‘I regard myself as a 
system, and I accept with positive valuation the fact that I am one, 
preferring to be one rather than fall to pieces and die; and I regard the 
person whom I love as systemic; and I regard my system and his or 
her system as together constituting a larger system with some degree 
of conformability within itself.’  72
Bateson posits that the logical organization of love—if it is to confront its entanglements 
with fantasies of mastery and minimize its casualties—follows the logic of metaphor: the 
potential of insight through proximal relevance, patterning out a way to know of the self, 
the other, the self-and-other, and the self-and-other-in-environment without a collapse of 
differentiation and scale. In Mary Catherine Bateson’s words, what is at stake is “the 
evocation of self-knowledge as a model for understanding another, because of similarities 
or congruences that make the knowing possible.”  The ‘self,’ my compounded psyche 73
and soma, demonstrates the interface of Creatura and Pleroma at a scale corporeally 
tangible. 
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 Because nothing in the embodied world is external to the self, because my epistemology 
should not be delimited to arbitrary boundaries, and because my life is not a clinical 
procedure, my own body (its positionality amidst the noise) will attest to the fluency with 
which I explore my own beliefs, biases and desires, the information I take and hold onto 
as true. Whatever “I” posit as progress within the discipline I partake in, I will also 
participate in a recursive history, fissured and injured by its own porosity. And as Bateson 
reminds us, any entity that participates in and is constitutive of a recursive system is 
confronted with the radical idea that it is of the same (or at least complementary) stuff of 
its environment; therefore, “all recursive systems contain the beginnings of self-
reference, or, shall we say, selfhood.”  A relevant yet distinct notion is Serres’ 74
designation of ‘the self’ as a tessera, a complicated, archival, compounded structure that 
multiplies in its emergent fractality. The tessera “is an individual; it is chance, it is 
complex; it is a memorial” ; it is that which asks the Sphinx’s riddle in as many 75
variations as possible. Among them is the aleatory question “Who am I?,” its repeated 
enunciation constituting a whole way of being. This tessellated self is unabstracted from 
the experiences of difference and interaction; it does not assert itself as a ‘thing’ nor does 
it pretend to exist without relationship. The self as tessera is inevitably unique, suffused 
and teeming with informational noise, an emergent promise of remembrance, of residual 
longing. And as such, it would be impossible to experience or know of another without 
the simultaneous observation of what sort of person one is oneself during the encounter. 
Such a process may articulate and gesture towards something like this: “My body is a 
memorial. […] My whole body is a memorial of you. If I love you, I remember you.”  76
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2. The Necessary Existence of Residues  
 « Metalogue: Broken open » 
Patient: Tell me something that’s real.  
Doctor: That is not for me to tell.  
P: Look at the framed pieces of paper on your walls, your business card, that white coat. 
You made a career out of telling people what is real and what is not. I need you to do the 
same for me.  
D: I could tell you that everything that you see and feel and think in your head is fiction, 
and list here in my notes all the symptoms that I think you are experiencing. I could write 
in bold that you have impaired judgment, self-destructive tendencies, affective pain, and 
so on. I could tell you forgo the messages your brain is sending you, to refuse to believe 
in your own sense of self, your own perception of things. I could tell you that this chair is 
real, violence and love is real, and that the potential for healing is real. But I would not be 
saying anything real, and I would not be telling you anything. This white coat does not 
grant me infinite or any other access into your mind and heart. I cannot prescribe reality 
for you with my words, no matter how ardently I tried, so perhaps we should shift the 
question with which to begin relating. 
P: Okay then, Doc, how do I get better? What can I say for you to determine me as 
normal as you? Tell me what I should do; at this point, I’ll do anything.  
D: I am not here to interrogate you, or to impose imperatives onto you that may threaten 
or guilt you in to changing your thoughts and behaviours. There is no test, no game. 
P: What is this all for then?  
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D: I am here to observe, and therefore participate in, the things that we convey to each 
other for whatever reason. So maybe we can start by trying to convey the emotional 
experiences that brought you here, and I will be your witness and try to respond as best as 
I can.   
P: Well, I am in a lot of pain. 
D: Can you be a little more specific?  
P: Nothing feels real because the world feels too close to me. I want to embrace it with 
my entire body, and it hurts to realize that this may then distance or suffocate the world 
away from me. I am left feeling discarded and cast aside, nonessential and wearying to 
the world that I feel too close to. I am not real to the world, and what I thought was real 
between the world and me never was. I desire closeness to the point of its impossibility. I 
believe too deeply in my own fiction.  
D: Your words, to me, describes a problem that resonates into a realm of scientific inquiry 
far beyond the confines of this context, this moment in time. The fact of intercorporeality 
and relationality is never easily understandable. Yet I believe this to be the very problem 
that science as a whole must reckon with if science is to match and meet with its 
exceedingly human, relational, fleshy demands. 
P: Whatever you say, Doc.  
D: My apologies. What comes to my mind in this present moment is that we all believe in 
our fictions, to some extent. This is not to devalue or invalidate your pain, but it is true 
that the stories and fantasies that we make to be a part of the world have scrambled and 
agitated and propagated human thought into territories good and bad, and everywhere in 
36
between. How would you describe the territory your fiction has consciously dared to 
tread?  
P: Nothing remains solid. Ever since I was a child, I made a habit of relying on my secret 
fantasy life to rescue me from tedious or tormenting surroundings—and it worked. The 
bite of my mind, the unfolding story-world it sought to construct and maintain, offered 
me a sanctuary from everything I perceived to be potentially unideal or dreadful. But my 
fiction began to grow and flow out with a mind of its own, engulfing the entirety of my 
being, my ability to stay in control. I was an enthralled puppeteer with the most nimble 
and dexterous fingers you’ve ever seen, creating the most marvelous spectacle with 
which to feel alive. Then suddenly, or eventually, or without a sense of order at all, my 
fingers completely numbed, and the strings that they once grasped melted into the 
puppets that realized they too have a mind of their own. The puppets turned their 
mocking gaze back to me, demanding that I reckon with the myth of control that I once 
relished and reveled in. They laugh at my impotence, at my romantic fantasies and 
enthusiasms, my feelings and desires, and I was left immobile as they proceed with their 
total conquest, beginning at the level of my own perception of myself. I have not left 
there ever since. 
D: What do you think will happen if you give into the puppets’ reign? 
P: I will no longer be of this world with you and this chair and this carpet and tea.  
D: What would you think or feel if you rejected it all together? 
P: If that was even a possibility, I would be unbearably broken open.  
D: Why is that unbearable?  
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P: I have never been without my fiction, a fiction with which to retreat from the world. 
My mind turning on me and actively ensuring that I no longer have agency over my own 
mind is, at the very least, a fiction too. The puppets may be mean and violent, but they 
are still my company. The loss I would feel if they were to disappear… even the thought 
threatens to undo me. Does this mean that they make me plural? 
What is unbearable is the prospect of being left alone with my own thoughts, in my own 
company, without a promise of another extending their presence to alleviate the weight of 
mine.  
D: So neither option is really viable in this situation. It seems that there could be a third 
option we can begin to explore here. Is hate the only emotion strong enough to reverse 
and remedy the intensities of love? What would the middle ground between wholesale 
acceptance and total denial of your fiction look like?  
P: I wouldn’t know where to begin describing such a thing. I have no grasp of reality, let 
alone the ability to articulate what it may entail. 
D: I am not sure either, but I will say that there is plenty of violence enacted in the name 
of reality, and what is made to function as reality in such a designated context. What you 
are feeling cannot be equated with an articulation, but perhaps it is at a feeling level of 
the body that we may begin to articulate from it. In articulating the impossibility of 
equating what is going on with linguistic renderings, no matter how eloquent and 
complex they may become, perhaps we gain access into a few more complex patterns, 
patterns that allow for the fluency and flexibility with which to return to the articulation 
at another vantage point. Language is in some sense just the surface output of intent to 
express meaning. It only makes sense if seen as part of a larger communication system 
beyond the cognitive to feeling, gestural expression, tone of voice… 
P: My stomach hurts. The puppets are starting to feel cramped.  
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D: Perhaps that is a necessary step towards breaking through, without breaking open.  
P: I guess I do deserve this discomfort. What is the asylum other than a cage in which 
one’s pain tolerance is endlessly tested…  
D: I wonder what the value in thinking that might be. My heart hurts to notice that the 
‘psychotherapy’ you’ve been exposed to does not know better than to posit a mastery of 
knowledge of your lived experience as the cure for what you may confront as a fact of 
life. For whatever its worth, I am here to tell you that such a model is, at best, 
unproductively reproductive of the same punitive model that has bound you from the 
beginning, and at worst, actively fueling an apparatus of violence that extends its reach 
beneath and beyond this room, and us.  
P: The puppets will not cease their noise with discipline, God knows I’ve tried. I have 
attempted to mimic what I learned from this place where I am told that my body, every 
sliver of my time, actions, and behaviour, is abnormal and wrong—and therefore must be 
besieged and codified into the doctor’s analysis. I tried exerting power over the puppets 
like so, and have succeeded only in amplifying their assaults. So excuse me Doctor, if I 
have difficulty in believing in your altruism.  
D: That may well be the case. I cannot demand your trust when it has been habitually 
abused by people in my position. There is nothing therapeutically valuable in collapsing 
the scales and nuances of how we think and speak of yourself and the puppets, in 
psychological and sociological discourses as a whole, for the sake of intellectual or 
institutional power. The syllogism must be rewritten.  
P: What a lovely thing to believe in.  
D: I have spent my career trying to articulate this to patients, colleagues, and 
administrates. Sadly, but hopefully, I am not surprised that the patients only seem to 
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understand this, at a material, bodily level. Power impairs those who insist on it. And yet, 
how untrusting these words may seem to you, by the natural function of the context we 
have met in. I have the hospital’s machinery inscribed on my own body and have only 
words with which to try and communicate to you otherwise. Knowing how vapid and 
mercurial these words may sound, perhaps I can say that the sole reason I am here with 
you is to facilitate, and perhaps help you to navigate your own process of healing, 
whatever that may mean for you. 
P: I don’t know what to think, let alone what to say. This painful incoherency has become 
my state of living.  
D: What is your body telling you? 
P: That this cannot go on.  
… 
P: So Doc, did I pass therapy?  
D: Therapy is nothing more than an instance of an interpersonal relationship. It cannot be 
passed and failed insofar as we have spent this time together talking to one another.  
P: But did we get anywhere?  
D: I do not have access to the metric deciding that.  
P: Nevertheless, we should try again next time.  
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 « i. The (therapeutic) double-bind » 
We see each other always with distorted eyes. 
Gregory Bateson  77
Anyone who is offended by this, I really encourage you to leave your body. 
            Nao Busmante  78
A young woman hits a point of crisis and ends up in the inpatient psych ward of a 
university hospital. After nine hours in the ER, a grim hospital turkey and mayonnaise 
sandwich she was forced to eat, four nurses and two doctors asking her the same 
questions, she waits for the psychiatrist to come do the same. She is thinking about her 
family, how tired she is, how dirty the bathroom is, and when all this will come to an end. 
And what she would do at that end, if she were to remain the same. The doctor finally 
enters the room. He walks in, leaves the papers and clipboard he was carrying by the 
door, holds out his hand and introduces himself. He ignores the chair across the room and 
chooses to lean on the counter adjacent to her bed. He stretches his arms out and back and 
lounges, as if he was there to hang out and wanted to ask if she’d like to split a pizza.  
He says something about what an awful day she must be having. She shrugs. He asks 
routine questions, details about what the medical student that came in before him took 
notes about, detail about her life, her childhood, her family, her thoughts. He tries to 
respond to each answer at the scale of his own experience. “Immigrant families, hey? I 
come from one too,” he says, when she has a difficult time explaining that her parents 
and grandparents have a different notion of mental health altogether, that they always 
believed that anything can be cured with determination and will and discipline just like 
how they survived all their hardships in life. He then prefaces his next question with: 
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“You might think I’m a complete asshole after this one, but please bear with me.” He 
asks her if any members of her family has died because of suicide. She replies no, 
expecting that he would cross off that box in the family mental health history category. 
He then asks her if she knew what a risk factor was, which she replies indeterminately 
that she does, but probably not exactly in the way that he intended. He explains that a risk 
factor is a thing that increases the risk of another thing, making something ‘more likely’; 
cigarettes are a risk factor for heart disease, alcohol is a risk factor for suicide, as is being 
poor, a white male, and socially isolated. He continues, saying that the one incomparably 
greatest risk factor for suicide, however, was having a history of suicide in one’s family. 
“Why I am telling you this when I’ve got already got an answer from you,” he said, “is 
because the next time you consider taking your life, think of how greatly you are 
impacting your family’s chances of killing themselves.”  
This doctor has put the patient in what Gregory Bateson and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann 
called a “therapeutic double-bind.” A notion of strategically and deliberately constructing 
a double-bind in hopes that it may facilitate for the bound individual their escape from 
the original one presupposes the double-bind of medical ‘benevolence.’ Because clinics 
exist for the benefit of various faculty, administrative staff, and executives (almost always 
disproportionately) along with the patient, there will be a kind of slight-of-hands 
employed, deliberately or structurally, that categorizes actions taken and decisions made 
as ‘benevolent' for the patient when actually they are intended to maintain bureaucratic 
policy and keep personnel more comfortable. Bateson cogently writes: “We would 
assume that whenever the system is organized for hospital purposes and it is announced 
to the patient that the actions are for his benefit, then the schizophrenogenic situation is 
being perpetuated.”  Emphasizing on Bateson’s identification of schizophrenia as a 79
situation (as opposed to an individual or a patient), the double-binding nature of such 
institutions may be defined as a structure perpetuating a bodily and linguistic denial of 
agency in order for it to remain unaffected. In other words, any attempt at verbalizing this 
Gregory Bateson, “Towards A Theory of Schizophrenia,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: 79
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42
systemically perpetuated deception on the patient’s part will inherently be framed as 
“schizophrenic,” in the sense that it will usually be indirectly laden with metaphors and 
other symbolic knots and densities, and will ultimately be left unable to comment on his 
situation as being deceived. The positioning of therapeutic double-binds as potentially 
restorative and productive presumes the fact that double-bind situations are actively being 
created by and within the psychotherapeutic setting and the hospital milieu, before and 
beneath the level of the individual psychopathology. 
It is from scrutinizing the psychiatric institution as the architecture of double-binds that I 
will begin unravelling double-bind theory as a tool for constructing a model of 
transcontextuality, and the body as a duration of metacommunicational, syntactic 
relationality entangled with larger networks of porous corporealities. Studying the 
intercorporeal and interaffective dynamics of psychotherapy may provide ground for 
defining and complicating the metric with which to measure its ‘success.’ 
Simultaneously, however, psychotherapy as a clinical practice is inevitably emergent 
from institutional hegemony and its structural-epistemological constraints. From this 
ongoing tension, I presuppose that the psychiatric institution, therefore, is inherently a 
carceral space, insofar as the subject in question is bound to the psychiatrist and the 
tokened validity of her knowledge as a figure of institutional, and therefore sovereign/
disciplinary power. It is also, however, a caesural space, insofar as participation in its 
duration marks a pause from the predictable pattern of one’s daily life, as well as a 
potentially necessary interruption from the affectively arduous task of reckoning with 
one’s own difference as an individual isolated by premises such as: ‘I am responsible for 
my pain,’ or ‘I do this to myself.’ In Kay Redfield Jamison’s personal words: 
“Psychotherapy is a sanctuary; it is a battleground; it is a place I have been psychotic, 
neurotic, elated, confused, and despairing beyond belief. But always, it is where I have 
believed—or have learned to believe—that I might someday be able to contend with all 
of this.”  80
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1995), 89. 
43
Bateson coins the term “transcontextuality” to describe the somatic application of 
double-bind theory as a “genus of syndromes” characteristic of the sort of communication 
and contact emerging in recursive systems, from the patient-therapist-institution system 
to the social or ecological system at large.  The transcontextuality of double-bind theory 81
lies in precisely this understanding that categories of normativity and pathology are 
profoundly entangled by way of the very process of identification that seeks to maintain 
them. Bateson writes: “Double-bind theory asserts that there is an experiential component 
in the determination or etiology of schizophrenic symptoms and related behavioural 
patterns, such as humor, art, poetry, etc. Within its terms there is nothing to determine 
whether a given individual shall become a clown, a poet, a schizophrenic, or some 
combination of these. We are not dealing with a single syndrome but with a genus of 
syndromes, most of which are not conventionally regarded as pathological.”  The 82
prescient insight that Bateson comes to in this moment is that such workings of ‘binds in 
the mind’ are not an eternal damnation to unreality, nor a machinery of diagnostics meant 
to identify particular bodies, but the pith of all human learning processes. These binds in 
the mind attest to the recursive, etiologically and ecologically complex nature of mental 
process in general, which may manifest in a particular corporeality as experientially 
painful, debilitating, confusing, etc. (i.e. schizophrenogenic), or experientially delightful, 
joyous, or meaningful (i.e. aesthetic experience, laughter) in another. To begin navigating 
the utterly volatile and context-dependent nature of double-binds requires an 
understanding—at some level of epistemological resonance—that a model of mind 
claiming unmediated, indifferent, neutral perception of what is going on is in actuality 
mired in arcs of power and mastery to the point of fallaciousness. Any sort of rapture or 
disturbance in the psyche, therefore, attests to the human impossibility of solipsism. The 
study of schizophrenia and the double-bind, then, “cease to be matters of individual 
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psychology and become part of the ecology of ideas in systems or ‘minds' whose 
boundaries no longer coincide with the kinds of the participant individuals.”  83
A story that Bateson was fond of telling to describe the etiology of the double-bind and 
its ‘therapeutic’ potentiality was Dr. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann’s demonstration of 
deliberately constructing a double-binding communicational sequence with one of her 
patients experiencing severe schizophrenia from a young age.  This patient was Joanne 84
Greenberg, who became the author of the 1964 fictionalized autobiography I Never 
Promised You A Rose Garden published under the pseudonym Hannah Green. She 
documents a young woman’s break with reality, and the eventual process of her 
therapeutic engagement with a “Dr. Fried.” In the novel, Deborah is a young woman who 
has built a hierarchy of gods in a complex system of political power that constructs 
reality for her. She expresses her hesitancy towards therapy to Dr. Fried by saying: “God 
R says I shouldn’t talk with you.” Dr. Fried/Fromm-Riechmann replies, in Bateson’s 
somewhat offhand narrative rendering: “Look, let's get something into the record. To me 
God R doesn’t exist, and that whole world of yours doesn’t exist. To you it does, and far 
be it from me to think that I can take that away from you, I have no idea what it means. 
So I’m willing to talk with you in terms of that world, if only you know I do it so that we 
have an understanding that it doesn’t exist for me. Now go to God R and tell him that we 
have to talk and he should give you permission. Also you must tell him that I am a doctor 
and that you have lived with him in his kingdom now from seven to sixteen—that’s nine 
years—and he hasn’t helped you. So now he must permit me to try and see whether you 
and I can do that job. Tell him that I am a doctor and this is what I want to try.”  In the 85
novel, this moment is prefaced by a conversation with Deborah’s usage of Yri, the 
language spoken on the territory of her gods. Dr. Fried wonders why she must use this 
Gregory Bateson, “Comment on Part III,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 83
1972), 339.
Gregory Bateson, “Towards A Theory of Schizophrenia,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: 84
Chandler Pub. Co., 1972), 226-227.
Gregory Bateson, “Towards A Theory of Schizophrenia,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: 85
Chandler Pub. Co., 1972), 226.
45
language, when she is so competent in English, to which Deborah replies: “English is for 
the world—for getting disappointed by and getting hated in. Yri is for saying what needs 
to be said.”  The conversation then continues as such:  86
 “I beg your pardon,” the doctor said. “I am perhaps a little jealous 
since you use your language to communication with yourself and not 
with us of the world.” 
 “I do my art in both languages,” Deborah said, but she missed the 
threat of the doctor, and the claim she was putting on the communication.  
 “Our time is over,” the doctor said gently. “You have done well to 
tell me about the secret world. I want you to go back and tell those gods 
and Collect and Censor that I will not be cowed by them and that neither 
of us is going to stop working because of their power.”  87
Dr. Fromm-Reichmann develops a double-bind to confront her patient with, the patient 
who is already caught in a double-bind with the gods in her head. If the doctor’s overt 
acknowledgement of and challenge to God R allows the patient to be rendered doubtful 
of God R’s legitimacy, then she is agreeing with the doctor that his reign is questionable, 
and indirectly admitting in turn the praxis of therapy as valid. If she ignores the doctor’s 
challenge and insist that God R is real, then she must actually “go to him” and tell him 
that this doctor is more powerful that he is—again, operating within the same context of 
involvement with the therapist. Fromm-Reichmann’s brilliance in this moment lies not in 
attempting to be ‘benevolent’ to the patient, but that she is appealing to and agitating her 
patient’s creativity, in order for her to effectively understand that this situation with the 
doctor cannot begin to be helpful if the voices of the gods still dominate the soundscape 
of her mind. The doctor’s response is intuitively calibrated to simultaneously validate the 
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patient’s experience and to help aid in reorganizing or restructuring such patterns of 
experience in a way that tethers the patient and her own sense of self back to the ground. 
Greenberg describes I Never Promised You A Rose Garden not as a case study in the 
strain of Freud’s Dora, but as “a hymn to reality.” She centralizes the oscillatory 
dynamics of the relationship between the young woman and her doctor as its primary 
subject matter, as a processual development of trust and mutual understanding emerging 
through their conversations is perceived throughout the text. Concurrently, Dr. Fromm-
Reichmann’s technical primer Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy, published four 
years before the novel, begins with a reflexive analysis of the psychiatrist’s positionality, 
including their personal and professional requirements that may be conducive towards or 
inhibiting of the whole psychotherapeutic process. Fromm-Reichmann defines the 
psychiatrist as a “participant observer,” one whose personality, as much as the patient’s, 
can only ever be understood by way of interpersonal relationships, and with this 
knowledge, “facilitate the accession to awareness of information about interpersonal 
problems and difficulties which will help to clarify for the patient the troublesome aspects 
of his life and ultimately to resolve his sympotomatology.”  Mental process is 88
unalterably an interpersonal process, and psychopathology is always on some level a dis-
ease of patterns of relationships. Particular to schizophrenic communication is the 
patient’s inability to comment upon or explicitly acknowledge information and message 
exchange about the interpersonal situation they are implicated in with the therapist; in 
other words, they are ensnared by a metacommunicative tangle that compels them to 
complicate or ‘redress’ their words when speaking about the pathogenic and often painful 
experiences at hand. 
Bateson writes that although the experience of a double-bind is often devastating and 
traumatic, double-binds are also integral to systemic growth and change, for “a gross 
disruption of the total system may be necessary to prevent the production of the 
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previously adaptive characteristic.”  To navigate such territory of taut contradiction, the 89
schizophrenic’s primary mode of communication adopts a dissociating, fictional, and/or 
repressing mode of verbalization and narrative construction. Metaphor becomes a method 
and tool for epistemological coping when confronted with knots of communicational 
paradoxes. The task of the psychiatrist as a participant observer is to decode, 
recontextualize, translate—that is interpret—such communications that are otherwise 
perceived and accepted as indecipherable ‘word salad.’ For Fromm-Reichmann and 
Bateson, such a tasks entails a process of “learning about learning” on the part of the 
therapist: a multiordinal, meta-level engagement with the patient’s entangled 
interpersonal situation at hand—whether in the larger pattern of relationships in the 
patient’s life or the inner relationships of the patient and their covert reveries—so as to 
imagine and organize counter-adaptive double-binds. First and foremost, the relationship 
between the therapist and the patient cannot be excluded from such a system of resonant 
intersubjectivity.  
Both Fromm-Reichmann and the doctor in the prefacing dialogue of this section frame 
their primary task as clinicians as engaging with the constructions of therapeutic double-
binds. The doctor in the anecdote anticipated the patient’s expectation of the message of 
his own question, covertly played along with it, and deftly turned it on their patient’s 
head. In a split second, the patient was confounded with something truly and profoundly 
unforeseen. Her response in the story starts from a fixed and assumed certainty of having 
no suicides in her family; she thinks there is no predisposition on her part so her attempt 
is more of a mortifying anomaly to her, and she remains spiraling in a self-condemning 
pattern of thought. This quickly dissolves when the therapist takes a disruptive turn, 
framing the situation back onto the patient so that she envisions herself as that very 
member of the family that sets a context for more violence and heartbreak via her fatal 
act. She is then mortified at a deeper or higher level, and is jolted into thinking in terms 
of how she will not endanger her loved ones, and therefore herself.    
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These therapists have constructed ‘tricks’ that release the patients from their preexisting 
conceptions of ‘self,’ and nudge them to enlarge the scope of their thinking outside of the 
impasse they are stuck in. Neither of the cases explicitly impose the desired outcome onto 
the patient (i.e. therapist explicitly saying some kind of version of ‘your way of thinking 
about such and such is wrong and causing you to be in danger’), but allows for the 
patients to participate in a fantasy, a what-if scenario that teaches or gestures towards 
something at the crux of their situation in-the-territory. Deborah must imagine the terror 
of confronting God R about his rule, the woman in the anecdote must imagine what it 
would be like to leave the world leaving nothing behind but risk for her family.  
This element of fantasy and play is at the crux of thinking about the therapeutic potential 
of double-binds. The experience of imagining oneself in a scene where the 
epistemological and communicational invasions we all encounter in life are indeed 
maneuverable and bearable is potentially an integral part of what Bateson calls the 
"characterological growth" of a system, whether that system is a single human body or a 
group of people or a society at large.  This is perhaps what he means when he posits art, 90
dream, and fantasy as necessary precursors towards encountering the systemic nature of 
life, and the dynamic praxis of psychotherapy processually defining itself as “a context of 
multilevel communication, with exploration of the ambiguous lines between the literal 
and metaphoric, or reality and fantasy.”  The therapeutic double-bind creates a revised 91
context in which messages that were contradicted and negated by the original bind is 
reorganized and remediated towards ‘meaning.’ Neither objective truth nor hallucination, 
the ‘meaning’ that may potentially be gleaned from such an experience is that it may 
illuminate to the patient-therapist system the ‘formal’ problems of having to forge contact 
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with reality necessarily through multiple levels of message exchange akin to fiction, 
fantasy, and art.  
Double-binds are structures that depend on a dynamics of (seemingly) inescapable 
runaway; that is, they must necessarily cycle to reproduce its patterned sequences over 
and over again in order to continue exerting its original function. Any act of interruption 
or disruption of a system in runaway will necessarily entail discomfort that may be 
overwhelming, but which does not have to be traumatic. In other words, the task of the 
psychiatrist becomes one of providing relief in the rigid rules of the clinical interaction 
that they must nonetheless occupy. Without such paradoxes, without such willingness to 
be flexible in a preformed structure or institution, the unfolding nature of relationality and 
communication would be stifled and stagnated. Change and humour, play and 
experimentation would be able to function as shared gestures of solidarity or rapport in a 
process of mutual double-binding that the therapeutic process may demand. Such 
flexibility of interaction also allows for a flexibility of interpretation; the therapist must 
glean meaning that does not invalidate their communicative value and relevance from the 
message material of the patient. As Bateson writes: “The psychosis seems, in part, a way 
of dealing with double-bind situations to overcome their inhibiting and controlling effect. 
The psychotic patient may make astute, pithy, often metaphorical remarks that reveal an 
insight into the forces binding him. Contrariwise, he may become rather expert in setting 
double-bind situations himself.”  92
Bateson offers a succinct definition of the double-bind as: “The experience of being 
punished precisely for being right in one’s own view of the context.”  Double-binds are 93
always interpersonal, i.e., entailing the concurrent participation of two or more 
individuals. They are also the byproduct of repeated experiences, ie., a recurrent theme in 
the experience of the victim, a body of traumata that structures habitual expectation of 
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dissonance, pain, violence, etc. This means that the victim of a double-bind enters into a 
space of ‘paranoia,’ of perceiving the double-bind even when it may not be there. This 
paranoia feeds an endless reproduction of the same double-bind at the very level of 
primary epistemological injunctions, inflicting messages of punishment and discipline for 
acting precisely in the way that the double-bind has intended. The impossibility and 
insanity of such a bind is pithily expressed in the doubled statement: “(If you) Do not do 
so and so, or I will punish you.”  94
 The radical wisdom of the therapeutic double-bind, however, lies in this recognition that 
the self-expression of the victim is (self)-policed by the threat of punishment, a threat that 
operates through pervasive forms of systemic constraints and oppressive structures of 
invalidation. The injunction that informs the individual how to or how not to act is 
fundamentally at odds with another secondary injunction that is imposed, which 
implicitly or explicitly prohibits the victim from even acknowledging, let alone escaping, 
the double-bind. The double-bind is ‘completed’ when the victim has learned to perceive 
his universe exclusively in double-bind patterns, i.e., any inkling of the existence of the 
double-bind (which is now ‘reality’) may be sufficient to induce affective disturbances of 
panic or rage. In other words, knowing the criteria for a double bind is insufficient as a 
method of protection or self-defence from feeling the painful affects of the double-bind. 
The fundamental logic of the therapeutic double-bind operates with the understanding 
that human experience and perception tend to become entrenched in their own traumata, 
and therefore the double-bind cannot be identified or “cured” by way of a prescriptive 
logic. Instead, the premise adopted is that the double-bind can be repeated into a higher 
order of awareness, towards constructing what Lauren Berlant calls “an impossible, but 
no longer unliveable, situation.”  95
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To finish the dialogue that began this section: after stating that his “guilt trip moment” is 
now over, he tells her that her life is “meaningful, irreplaceable, and connected by the 
people that would be devastated if she were gone.” And repeats again, with words, that 
these are not just words. He looks into her eyes and tells her something that will change 
her for the rest of her life, although it may not be conscious to her all the time: “Every 
time you think you are worthless or disposable,” he said, “think of how your family and 
friends would feel about that, and how they are affected.” He explained to her his plan, 
saying that he is not going to give her a “diagnostic name tag” and a pill prescription, that 
he cannot and will not presume to “chemically cure you of your stresses.” He will do his 
absolute best trying to find a network of people in her school and community that will 
help her but emphasizes that she has to be willing to try, willing to come back again. He 
tells her that he has two years left in his residency so he cannot be her regular doctor, but 
that she should come find him if a crisis happens again because he cares about what 
happens to her.  
This is a personal story of how one individual began to seek therapy. This interaction did 
nothing to change the state of her body as it was just words, or more broadly messages 
exchanged. She was left, however, feeling the weight of something—simultaneously, 
gradually, suddenly—being lifted from her head and chest. One doctor, an overworked 
junior psychiatry resident who cared enough treat this young woman not as another 
rotation to complete, but as a person in a difficult bind, allowed her to feel for the first 
time that she could trust the person across from her (or more precisely next to her) in a 
clinical setting. If there is any meaning to be gleaned from such an encounter, it would 
perhaps be that there was at that time, and therefore is still, the residual potential for real 
healing. 
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« ii. The syntaxic body, an anomy of the norm » 
For those of us living with severe mental illness, the world is full of cages where we can 
be locked in. My hope is that I’ll stay out of those cages for the rest of my life, although I 
allow myself the option of checking into psychiatric ward if suicide feels like the only 
other option. I maintain, years later, that not one of my three involuntary hospitalizations 
helped me. I believe that being held in a psychiatric ward against my will remains among 
the most scarring of my traumas. 
Esmé Weijun Wang  96
There is no music in the asylum. There is only noise, fractured parts that may be heard as 
slivers of meaning, launching one’s body into an untranslated potential, a heightened 
awareness of one’s own skin and shape. The patient may attempt a process of 
assemblage, to put these parts into some identifiable relation, and perhaps then she can 
begin to call this situation as what it is. She wishes to be bound to the noise, these 
isolated entities. She wants to live a life committed to the construction of meaning, no 
matter how constructed. But where does the music lie? Surely these parts, these few 
simple chords cannot cause the strange otherness that she feels on the skein of her body. 
The only possible source of difference is in some sort of complexity. What she feels to be 
strange and otherworldly is always rooted on the ground, emergent from a complex 
pattern of material activities that is anything but supernatural.  The magic behind magic, 97
the vibratory resonances behind vibration, lies beneath and beyond one’s visibility. The 
panoptic gaze of the asylum can fix her in her place, while she forgets what it feels like to 
stand on solid ground, what it is like to exist without the endless paranoia of existing. 
One cannot see the music in such a place. 
 Esmé Weijun Wang, The Collected Schizophrenias: Essays (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Graywolf Press, 2019), 96
110. 
 Douglas Hofstadter, “Pattern, Poetry, and Power in the Music of Frédéric Chopin,” Metamagical Themas: 97
Questing for The Essence of Mind and Pattern (Basic Books; Revised ed. edition, 1996), 174. 
“The magic behind magic is pattern. The magic of life itself is a perfect example energizing as it does out of 
patterned but lifeless activities at the molecular level. The magic of music emerges from complex, nonmagical
—or should I say /meta/magical?—patterns of notes.”
53
In summary, the first section arrived at the premise that the effects of a (therapeutic) 
double-bind is immediate and immanent in the body. From here, I would like to prioritize 
my analysis to the body as the very site in which the structural and systemic problems of 
psychiatric therapeutics can be begin to be examined. I borrow from Harry Stack 
Sullivan’s concept of “syntaxic experience” to model the immanent and material 
importance of any attempt at constructing a theory of interrelational communication in a 
psychiatric context. Differing from the prototaxic (referring to communicational modes 
before the usage of symbols) and parataxic (referring to forms of experience that occur at 
the first order of private thought and feeling, mostly nonverbal and socially isolated 
communication) modes of experience, Sullivan defines syntaxic experience as defined by 
the interpersonality and interaffectivity of communication.  This presupposes that 98
syntaxic experience must occur from one person to another engaged in a larger system of 
communicative and experiential contexts than one’s own frame of psychological or 
linguistic reference. Sullivan writes: “Consensually validated symbols underlie almost all 
operations in the syntax mode; what distinguishes syntax operations from everything else 
that goes on in the mind is that they can under appropriate circumstances work quite 
precisely with other people.”  Sullivan’s interpersonal theory of psychiatry posits that a 99
“consensually validated meaning of language” operates to elaborate the temporal-
durational interpenetrability of knowledge in any instance of communicational 
exchange.  In other words, written on the body is the anticipations of the past, the 100
expectations of the future, forged together in order to construct some basis of ‘reality’ to 
understand the present. In Eugene Gendlin’s words: “Let us think from and speak from 
how we experience the present with the body, and how the past is in the present and in 
the body, indeed how the body is a kind of past, a past that is now involved in 
experiencing the present.”   101
 Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York and London: W. W. Norton 98
Company, 1953), xiv. 
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The necessary existence of residues at the level of the body points to an understanding of 
phenomenological time as bodily residue, the abject object of residual memory, and 
perhaps trauma. That which is residual, surplus, lingering become abject through the 
myth of power to identify and prescribe. Yet by the very nature of their existence, one 
may continue to recognize residue in imminent relation to the self and the body. A theory 
of the syntaxic body, then, emerges from the fundamental acceptance of the role of the 
body in the generation of any kind of meaning, which remains in some form relating back 
to the body and its material contexts. Eugene Gendlin’s theoretical contribution to 
psychotherapy posits “full-bodied process” as a pattern of implicit resonance forging 
beneath the perceptible level of syntaxic communication. Gendlin’s process model begins 
with and returns to the primacy of the body in its symbolic functions and internal 
(in)coherences: “The process is not only an occurring but also always an implying… We 
want to understand the living body’s own indicating, own implying, own way of being 
now or here and also being something that is not occurring now and/or here.”  Because 102
the body is always already in dialectical engagement with the situational environment it 
finds itself in, and because we can, and indeed perhaps must, go so far to say that the 
situational environment is the body’s process, a notion of bodily knowing becomes the 
central phenomenon that dialectical patterns of psychotherapy must strive towards 
understanding. 
  
The structural problem, however, remains to be confronted. The possibility of its 
confrontation is made exceedingly difficult by its volatile, and perhaps even invisible 
pervasiveness. In “Psychiatric Power,” the lectures given at the College de France from 
1973 to 1974, Michel Foucault posits that what is essential and inextricable to the 
dynamics of power is that “ultimately, its point of application is always the body. All 
power is physical, and there is a direct connection between the body and political 
power.”  Yet, the violence of power, that is, the ‘material’ epiphenomena of such 103
Ibid., 29.102
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power’s exertions, may not always manifest as physical mutilation, a gory scene of blood 
and guts and limbs. The very computation of the violence of power being one of fleshy, 
bodily harm actually maintains the deleterious notion of flesh separated from mind, of the 
body somehow distinct from the mental processes that translate its experiences of pain 
and suffering. If we consider mind in its form and substance, the deployment of 
punishment has never quite relocated away from the body, nor has it ever lost its 
materiality. The violence inflicted may be “bodiless” in the sense that there is no longer a 
public spectacle to behold, but it is no less fleshy and actual.  Bateson writes: “However 104
well-intentioned the urge to cure, the very idea of ‘curing’ must always propose the idea 
of power,” and any idea of power must be located and seen within the prevailing 
materialist epistemology that the field of psychiatry operates within and through.  105
Foucault also instigates an awareness of when he makes an appeal to the material 
epiphenomena of epistemological presuppositions in the ongoing construction of 
discourse production. He writes: “A corpus of knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ 
discourses is formed and becomes entangled with the practice of power to punish.”  The 106
“condemned man,” by Foucault’s definition, is the man who is no longer seen: victim of 
the shifting punitive schema from the body to the “soul” as the locus of punishment, the 
condemned man is no longer bruised and bloody on the surface of his body but executed 
from the inside out. The traces of his stigmatization no longer have a visual index with 
which to grasp them, and any attempt to verbalize this process of stigmatization cannot 
escape a confined, hallucinatory parataxic level. Foucault posits this “an execution that 
affects life rather than the body,” for there is no method more effectively disembodying, 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 104
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disenfranchising, and abstracting that denying the duration of one’s pain from their own 
perceptibility, in order to suggest that the cure to this pain is an achievable ‘thing'.   107
The body of the condemned is characterized by a denial of its own bodily reality from the 
outside, consistently hyperaware of being seen as an object of another’s presuppositions. 
The condemned thrashes inside his own untouched body without the verifiable, physical 
intervention of the stigmatizer. Because there is no residue to this violence of disciplinary 
power, the stigmatizer’s actions remain illegible for reprehension. In Foucault’s words, 
“The apparatus of punitive justice must now bite into this bodiless reality.”  What 108
hemorrhages from the punished body is no longer blood and infection, but immaterial 
beliefs about infarctions in the self, the septicity of internalized surveillance and 
judgement. This is the ideal form of psychiatric stigmatization as a mechanism of power. 
It revels silently and ‘invisibly' in its own teleological completion, beneath the level of 
conscious presuppositional premises in both the stigmatizer and the stigmatized. The 
institutions of psychiatry, then, exist as the totalizing “agent of intensification” of the 
reality that the body is actively denied perception of, and psychiatric power refers to 
nothing but the “surplus power of reality” that is exerted and prescribed.  Inscribed, 109
coded, and structured on the asylum apparatus is the premise that reality becomes reality 
only in the process of being prescribed from a context of insurmountable hierarchy of 
authority and position. “The asylum is reality in its taken power, it is reality medically 
intensified, it is medical action, medical power as knowledge, which has no other 
function that to be the agent of reality itself.”  110
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 107
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In the power that emerges from the eluding and secretive nature of the nonresidual and 
the invisible, Foucault locates a concurrent emergence of the stigmatizer’s impulse to 
construct a tyranny of surveillance for a fantasy of ‘health’ or ’safety’. Foucault’s 
panoptic mechanism, then, can be understood as a heightened peak-state of an insane 
society. The Benthamian panopticon portrays a political utopia of ultimate self-
surveillence that propagates disciplinary power by way of individuation. The individual is 
seen as hermetically sealed and isolated so as to be a clean-cut target to assign 
culpability; the act of declaring individuality is a commitment to an eternal reproduction 
of the same object of visibility, and therefore of control. “Inspection functions 
ceaselessly. The gaze is everywhere.”  The individual under the panoptic gaze describes 111
in particular the phenomenological reality of the stigmatized and medicalized individual 
caught in an infernal double-bind of self and (in)visibility. The fact of one’s own visibility 
constructs conservatories of unchecked paranoia, where whether the ‘prisoner’ is actually 
observed by an external inspector no longer holds significance for it is the knowledge that 
one is being surveilled that monitors and facilitates one’s own surveillance. Just as long 
as the subject thinks and breathes ‘for himself,’ adheres with desperation and resistance to 
the remains of a love for the self, the paranoia of being seen without seeing back is 
reinforced into the very structure of the territory he occupies. 
The impact that Harry Stack Sullivan had on the field of theoretical psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis (including the likes of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Erich Fromm, Clara 
Thompson, among others) was his ability to think transcontextually about such structures 
of the territory, the relatedness between psychiatry and other social sciences. Performing 
a ‘field-theory’ approach to his work in clinical settings allowed him to also posit the 
psychiatrist as a “participant observer,” one who sifts through defined norms, accounting 
for the forces and arcs of influence that creates such categories of the abnormal and 
anomalous. The method of participating observation relegates data obtained by methods 
other than what is emergent from the interactions of the person-to-person psychiatric 
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interview to, at most, a secondary, peripheral importance. The interdisciplinary 
resonances of Sullivan’s psychotherapeutics can be gleaned from his concept of “a 
psychiatry of peoples,” outlined in the last section of his latest work, the 1953 
posthumous publication The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Sullivan posits the 
bodily experience of anxiety as the necessary disruption of security operations, the 
accepted habits of the self-system reproduced in order for the self-system to maintain its 
current way of doing things. Anxiety, simply defined, is the words used to describe the 
moment when “one has become aware that one is uncomfortable,” and it is the “telltale 
[sign] that shows increased activity of the self-system in the interpersonal field of the 
moment concerned.”  A “psychiatry of peoples” depend upon bearing through the 112
anxieties of interpersonality, of attuning to the patterns (and patterns of patterns) of 
intersubjective behaviour, for these patterns are the only way we have access to 
information about developments (and pathologies) in individual personality. Sullivan’s 
theory of psychiatry and interpersonal relations emerge from the central presupposition 
that the therapist should “help patients to help themselves” through cultivating a mutual 
and consensual knowledge of the patient’s patterns of relationality and life events, and if 
the therapist has any kind of professional goal in mind, it is to become “better and better 
informed about the factors which govern the possibilities of interpersonal action.”  113
Another instance of psychiatric fieldwork with an interactional tenor is Erving Goffman’s 
year of field research at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, DC, where he went 
“undercover” to write his seminal work Asylums in 1961.  Goffman analyzes the 114
psychiatric hospital institution via a sociological lens, describing the mental hospital as a 
“total institution” akin to a prison or concentration camp or monastery, where disciplinary 
measures and regimentation dominated every aspect of the patients’ daily life. At the crux 
of such domination was the systemic denial of these patients’ means of self-efficency and 
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expression at a level of their speech and communication. To use words to convey one’s 
experience, decisions, actions, reception of a message, understanding of a suggestion or 
command, and so on, is to sustain some certainty that he is capable of being self-
determining. The importance of “rhetoricality" in self-determination points to the ability 
of verbalizations, an exchange of words, before the level of physical altercation—the 
ability to protect his physical body in situations of threat or command. Goffman writes, 
however, that “the inmate in a total institution can find himself denied even this kind of 
protective distance and self-action,” for when placed in a context of a totalizing carceral 
space, “the statements he makes may be discounted as mere symptom… The inmate may 
find that a dual language exists, with the disciplinary facts of his life given a translated 
ideal phrasing by the staff that mocks the normal use of language.”  Far from 115
instantiating a context of recovery, Goffman maintains that the asylum actively produced 
the structural conditions in which the sorts of disordered behaviour (characterized as 
abnormal and for which the patients were ostensibly admitted) were being created. This 
double-binding structural restraint of the psychiatric hospital is exacerbated and 
maintained by the institution, becoming a closed system from the rest of society and 
indeed actively creating instability in one’s perception of the outside world—of ‘reality.’ 
Goffman locates methods of institutional routine and isolation as instigating bodily 
processes of a mortification of the self, from myriad forms of physical and social abuse to 
the violence of stigmatization. The “‘mentally ill’ . . . suffer not from mental illness, but 
from contingencies, for “the behaviour of patients in psychiatric wards is best understood 
as symptomatic and reactionary of a context of ‘‘situational improprieties.’’  116
It is an easy task for posterity to position both Sullivan and Goffman’s accounts of 
institutionalization as utterly involved with structures of desire and power from the get-
go, performing a scholarly neutrality that exposes their privileged positionalities at work 
to maintain a guise of impartiality and openness to the object of inquiry at hand. Both 
 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (Anchor; 115
Reprint edition, 1961), 45. 
 Ibid., 135.116
60
analyses indeed depend on a standard of disentanglement and disinterestedness to 
maintain the precision and effectiveness, and therefore validity, of their acts of scrutiny. 
The intimacy of scrutiny can allow for an effective investigation of the intersubjective 
matter, and yet some intimacies are unwanted and contrived for the implicated other, and 
therefore always necessarily partial. Although both projects aim to draw attention to 
epistemological and structural rigidities in the clinical environment as a whole, the 
phenomenological limitations of both projects must be included in their investigation. In 
Goffman’s words, “To describe the patient’s situation faithfully is necessarily to present a 
partisan view,” a description that begins from an awareness of the descriptor’s inevitable 
tendency to be unfaithful.  117
From this point of “doubled mutability,” I would like to posit the potential fruitfulness of 
accounting for narratives within the psychiatric setting as a process in which thought 
itself is encountered as largely implicit and implicated in a gesturing towards an 
integrated sense of complexity. The order of thought, and any potential for meaning 
emergent in that thought, comes from the implying and participating function of that 
which is presently occurring. This brings us to conceive of psychotherapeutics 
embodying or miming a model of relevant emergence that the existence of metaphor 
depends upon: “… communication in the psychiatric interview [as well as in written form 
of the scholarly texts] is by no means solely a matter of exchanging verbal contexts, but 
is rather the development of an exquisitely complex pattern of field processes which 
imply important conclusions about the people concerned.”  The implicit function of the 118
Foucauldian, interpersonal and processual model of therapy is that it cannot rely on an 
arbitrary metric of relatedness that defines itself in terms of a preexisting similarity, for 
this would cause participants to inevitably subscribe to some kind of hegemonic standard 
of normativity. In the model of relevant emergence, then, it is the very process of the 
‘metaphor’— the intricate logic of non-logic, the order of thought beneath explicit 
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  Henry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York and London: W. W. Norton 118
Company, 1953), 381.
61
occurrences and concepts— that ‘creates’ the relevance and similarity that provides a 
means of explication. Perhaps this is what Bateson meant when he designated metaphor 
as “not just pretty poetry, neither good or bad logic, but the logic upon which the 
biological world had been built” : evolutionary organization depends not upon the 119
separation and classification of subjects, but the arrangement of shared predicates in the 
organisms’ embryological process. In other words, it is only in the process of language 
that ‘subjects’ exist (and therefore the separation of subjects from predicates), and the 
biological world in its evolutionary process never needed language. Or, perhaps, there is 
language in nature, but a language that human logic cannot wield because it is only ever 
determined by context.  The structure of thought immersed in a process of equating 120
predicates without a classification of hierarchy of subjects allows access into a corpus of 
knowledge which can be designated as implicit and emergent. That which is known is 
only ever knowable through elaborate differences of patterns, and the nature of 
relationships can begin to be understood in this ‘realm’ of knowing and organization that 
Bateson designated as ‘metaphorical.’ 
Foucault defines the residual as “that which is irreducible to the system”; because every 
system has its margins, and with margins comes the necessary existences of parts which 
its patterns of search are unable to account for, “the system will inevitably confront the 
unclassifiable, the unsupervisable, the indistributable.”  He designates the “mentally ill” 121
as a new residual class, the anomic remains persisting in their unanswerability: “As for 
the mentally ill, they are no doubt the residue of residues, the residue of all the 
disciplines, those who are unassimilable to all of a society’s educational, military, and 
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police disciplines.”  If disciplinary power actively ensures that this residual class is 122
anomized, that is, defined by their very lack of normative standards, it is ultimately 
discarded from serious consideration. Yet it is this very anomic quality from which the 
irreducible, the systemic and cybernetic, the nonschismogenic class may potentially 
emerge. Anomies of the norm presuppose the complexity of internal interrelations and 
interruptions as actively participating in a sort of structural-semantic isotopy, a constant 
reiteration and renewal of experience moving towards unexpected insights and 
coherences via intersubjective interpretation. In other words, because “one may be or 
may become mentally stable to the extent of one’s awareness of, our ability to become 
aware of, interpersonal experiences,” it is towards this ‘goal’ of interpretive, mutual 
clarity that the psychotherapist must facilitate the clinical interaction.  The (nonlineal, 123
nonlogical, implicit and implicated) communication shared between the patient and the 
therapist is aimed to arrive at a level of constructive and curative insight into patterns of 
the patient’s interpersonal personal experiences. This communication must then be 
framed and presupposed by an awareness of the patient’s anomic existence in larger, 
insensitive and mechanistic, if not actively hostile normative contexts. This is not to 
construct identitarian pigeonholes or assign blame and shame, but to increase a sense of 
importance of the self-system’s physical, phenomenological experience amidst the noise 
of normativity. 
  
The problem of prescribing ‘responsibility' is irrefutably entangled with the problem of 
agency in any discussion of the double-bind: how is the individual to be held responsible 
for that which refuses his involvement in the matter, for the processual outcomes and 
dynamics of the situation which he cannot mediate? I believe this is intricately entangled 
with the question I began this section with: Where does the music, the patterned 
sequences of relationality, lie? How does one make “poetry out of being invisible,” to 
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borrow Ralph Ellison’s words?  An attempt to truly feel the vibrations of this knot of 124
questions would entail some sort of engagement in as paradoxical a process as the initial 
double bind. It is precisely at the moment of double-binding experience that disrupts and 
shakes our ‘safe illusions’ about the self and other that we come closer to an awareness of 
the deep premises that form our perceptual processes. And perhaps herein lies the music, 
the perceptual sensitivity (which is always epistemological) that therefore allows us to be 
ready to accept insights about the self and the world as they emerge. In the context of an 
epistemology and therefore a construction of power which gives into a pathologization of 
certain bodies and phenomenologies, the experience of being seen and not being seen 
becomes an extended experience of participating in the paranoia that is a privilege not to 
perceive. Mary Gaitskill conveys the moment of experiencing one’s own body as a 
personal piece of reprieve, a source of sustenance emergent by way of its inherent 
musicality: 
I drank and bit the rim of my plastic cup and lost myself in the music 
on the sound system. I had succeeded. I had become like this music. 
My face had been a note in a piece of continuous music that rolled 
over people while they talked and drank and married and made babies. 
No one remembers a particular note. No one remembers a piece of 
grass. But it does its part. I had done my part.”  125
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« iii. Transcontexuality » 
There ought to be some kind of contrapuntal relationship between the singing the nitrogen cycle, 
the cargo cults, and the stuff going on in somebody’s head. 
Mary Catherine Bateson  126
The first two sections brought attention to the immediate relation of the body in attempts 
to map out the morphology and etiology of double-binds, both pathological and 
therapeutic. Any attempt to arrive at situational clarity in a knot of double-binding 
premises, regardless of scale and content, entails a process of navigating the complexities 
with which communication bends and spirals into varied articulations of the relationality 
incessantly present. Such a presupposition induces the scientist or general inquirer to 
begin their investigations cognizant of the potential emergence of lateral, transcontextual 
affects in their particular scope of pursuance. As Bateson demonstrated, the rather strange 
and eccentric contribution of double-bind theory to the field of psychiatry is its 
movement away from the discipline itself, thereby performing an interruption and 
epistemological enlargement to its ‘disciplinary’ power. Bateson’s double-bind theory 
depends upon the treatment of its psychiatric case studies of schizophrenic 
psychopathology as neither more important nor more scientifically valid or serious than 
other formalizations of creativity emergent from such meta-level “tangles of 
epistemological contradiction.” In Bateson’s words: 
Humor, art, poetry, religion, hyponosis, and so on are equally rich, 
equally informative, and equally alien to the epistemology of both 
logic and direct causality. He who would discover for himself what 
ideas are made of and how ideas combine to make a mind must 
wander in one or more of these transcontextual mazes.  127
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The non-linear and contingent eco-mental system that we consider the human mind is 
entangled with wider eco-mental systems that condition the environments in which our 
minds are allowed to exist and flourish. When Bateson famously phrased the statement 
“Difference is what makes a difference,” he was appealing to a notion of intrinsic 
relationality or nonsovereignty among parts of a living system. Difference is an appeal to 
the sensitivities and irritabilities of entities encountering other entities, for the 
transmission and reception of information is inevitably a phenomenological and somatic 
experience. The descriptors of natural ecology rely on the vocabulary of ‘states’ and 
‘conditions’ to articulate the characterological process of identity, the identifiable, 
ontological traits of a living entity. Yet Bateson asserts that life can only exist in terms of 
difference: “The step from mind to body is the step from state to difference… As long as 
you have difference, that is, the possibility of moving your states, by rubbing them on 
differences, then you have ‘mind.’”  What Bateson designates as a world of difference 128
is precisely the perception of the ‘eco-mental’ layers of systemic life, as well as the 
matter of articulating such perception, a process which is necessarily transcontextual.  
In “Birth of a Matrix,” Bateson relates a story of one of the dolphins in his care at the 
Oceanic Institute to explicate the provenance of transcontextuality as a ‘fundamental’ 
characteristic of epistemological transparency in scientific investigation. With this 
particular dolphin, he learned that exerting discipline and punishment regarding her 
(in)ability to follow the (arbitrary) rules with which she must engage with her trainer and 
other dolphins—in short, entrapping her in a double-bind—caused severe discomfort and 
maladjustment in her behavioural patterns. He came to the insight that if the pathology 
can be resisted, that is, if there could be some kind of a communicational alternative to 
blame and punishment, the total experience of participating in relational tangles would 
promote creativity instead of experiences of pathological pain. Bateson documented again 
and again in his observational notes some variation of this statement: “We had to tell the 
Gregory Bateson and Robert W. Rieber, “Mind and Body: A Dialogue,” in Body and Mind: Past, Present and 128
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animal that in spite of her failure to solve the problem, she was still ‘loved.’”  Or, as 129
Donna Haraway writes, the scientist must have learned to signify in his own work “a 
nasty developmental infection called love.”  130
The difference that made a difference in this encounter was the scientist’s active search 
for a method—no matter how similarly arbitrary as the initial, painful double-bind—with 
which to explicitly comment upon the relationship between the dolphin and the trainer as 
an integrated part of the behavioural study of the dolphin. Telling the animal that ‘she 
was still loved’ is akin to the therapist setting a context of immovable validation as a 
necessary precursor to any sort of scientifically ‘feasible,’ therapeutic practice. The 
premise of metacommunicational entanglement explored in the pathologies of 
schizophrenic states remain unchanged: the double-bind, as well as the general structure 
of the double-bind that can formally be called paradox, can only exist in the cybernetic 
domain of hierarchal levels, of oscillatory, undulating contradictions between statement 
and meta-statement, message and context.  
Bateson’s notion of ‘self-validating metaphors,’ then, resides at the crux of the 
therapeutic double-bind, which actively acknowledge that the propositions exchanged 
between a therapeutic relationship that ‘make a difference’ operate at a level of 
transcontextual, metaphoric resonance, at a higher level of abstraction that is not quite 
‘described’ and ‘experienced’ as matters of teleological goals and conscious purpose.  131
This level of abstraction and learning is a meta-level, a level of learning to learn and 
“learning the context… creating the metaphors by which you are going to be living.”  132
These metaphors can be described as self-validating because of their transcontextuality; I 
 Gregory Bateson, “The Birth of a Matrix, or Double Bind and Epistemology,” A Sacred Unity: Further Steps 129
to an Ecology of Mind, ed. Rodney E. Donaldson (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 209.
 Donna Haraway, “The Companion Species Manifesto” in Manifestly Haraway (Minneapolis: University of 130
Minnesota Press, 2016), 95.
 Symtomatic and therapeutic paradox and their self-validating metaphors must be conducive to 131
epistemological change, as in the original sense of the Greek verb epistamai meaning to put oneself “over” or 
“higher” in order to better observe the phenomenon at hand. 
 David Berenson Interview with Gregory Bateson, March 1980, 20.132
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will behave and become like the contexts I occupy, for context does not govern what I am 
going to learn, but the way in which I am going to learn in the future. Were I to follow 
Bateson’s steps and ‘classify’ statements regarding the nature of self entangled with 
another as contextual, I would define the psychotherapeutic relationship as one conducive 
to the examination and reorganization of self-validating contexts the person in question 
occupies. The matter here only increases in complexity: “What happens to my self-
validating contexts when it’s going to be interacting with yours?”   133
During the 1968 conference at Burg Wartenstein on “The Effects of Conscious Purpose 
on Human Adaptation,” documented by Mary Catherine Bateson in Our Own Metaphor, 
Bateson (perhaps deliberately) gave formal description to his lifelong transcontextual 
search as searching for “a formal description of the ways in which human planning and 
applied science tend to generate pathology in the society or in the ecosystem or in the 
individual.”  The double-bind theory is one instance of such formal description, one 134
meta-application or meta-articulation of the scientific questions he wished to ask about 
the nature of explanation. Mind must be immanent in any instance of explaining systems, 
as well as the complexity necessarily present in the generation of such systems. If 
material systems that engage in self-corrective, recursive behaviour and exhibit processes 
of relationality and mutual entanglement are said to ‘have’ a mind—in short, if mind is 
immanent in nature—the nature of explanation of the mind-body problem undergoes a 
radical re-articulation. Such a task may necessarily demonstrate an ample dependency on 
the representative metaphors used to describe or evoke focalized relations, including the 
relationship between the individual and the overlapping whole, the relationship between 
creativity and schizophrenia, the relationship between the past, present, and future, work 
and play, and of the ‘mind’ and ‘body—if and where such terms exist.  
 Ibid., 21. 133
 Mary Catherine Bateson, Our Own Metaphor: A Personal Account of a Conference on the Affections of 134
Conscious Purpose on Human Adaptation (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1972), 31.
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The task of reorganizing the epistemological boundary of mind and nature may 
necessarily begin with the repetition of a familiar story. The postulations of science from 
the 17th to the 19th century allowed causation and determination to be perfectly 
explained with linear clarity and mechanistic precision. Newton revolutionized the 
practice of natural description as quantitatively sane, wholly translatable to the language 
of mathematics, and compounded with a widespread commitment to Baconian principles 
of observation and induction as the approach to causality, the ‘new’ scientific model of 
inquiry was based on empirical evidence present to the human senses or that could be 
made present with technological applications. Furthermore, Darwin succeeded in 
demonstrating the evolutionary problem as reducible to natural ‘law.’  If the agency of 135
evolution was posited as transcendent rather than immanent, it becomes of utmost 
importance to demonstrate that the unknown, unmastered territory—the life of the 
individual organism—could not be comprised of anything that would affect and influence 
the evolutionary territory. Bateson postulates, however, that at the same time these 
objective scientists had to believe in a continuity in nature, so that ultimately the whole of 
natural phenomena would prove describable by the parts they have examined, and 
susceptible to their analysis. Another law, Charles Lyell’s geological uniformitarianism, 
catalyzed this sense of certainty with which to assert that the same processes operating 
today must have operated in the past.  It was therefore a matter of necessity, therefore, 136
to set up a particular split between the biology of the individual and the theory of 
evolution.  When Descartes created the Cartesian graph, he further instantiated a 137
general split of coordinates across the entire field of scientific thought. He succeeded in 
 The relationship between Social Darwinism and 19th century imperialism and liberal capitalism cannot go 135
without some mentioning: “At the present day civilized nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous nations; 
and they succeed mainly though not exclusively, through their arts, which are the products of the intellect. It is, 
therefore, highly probably that with mankind the intellectual faculties have been gradually perfected through 
natural selection. […] With savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated; and those that survive 
commonly exhibit a vicious state of health. We civilized men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the 
process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws… 
[…] At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilized races of man will almost 
certainly exterminate, and replace, the savage races throughout the world.” Charles Darwin, The Descent of 
Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1871), 160; 177. 
 Charles Lyell, Principles of Geology (Penguin Classics, 1998). 136
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determining that ‘variables’ are to be handled separately for the sake of the scientist’s 
unambiguous method. Namely the variables were matter and mind, matter as a horizontal 
coordinate and its opposite, mind, contrasted as the vertical. In other words, phenomena 
that are not present through empirical observation (feelings, perspectives, positionalities, 
values, judgements, fantasies, desires) were relegated to a transcendent spirit or soul 
describable mainly through spiritual or ecclesiastical explanation—and thus not 
considered relevant to “science.”  
Bateson determined the mind-body problem, and its atomistic and flat epistemological 
approach owing a great deal to Newtonianism, Cartesianism, and the bioenergenetics of 
nineteenth-century field theory, was the greatest obstacle to cybernetic method and 
recursive epistemology. The problem can be stated as such: the split of matter from mind, 
mind from body induces a detrimentally false, ‘insane’ understanding of how the natural 
world, and the human’s relation to it, operates. His lifelong career, and the resonances his 
work has for his posterity may be conceived as a profound attack on this separation of 
coordinates, of mind and matter, of psychology and the soma, of ecology and human 
complicity. He was fond of facetiously reminding his audience that the map is never the 
territory; there are no actual finches in Darwin’s theory of selection, Bacon’s empirical 
observations cannot read minds, there are no kidneys or gall bladders in the corpus of 
genotypic material, and so on. The events and objects about which the message material 
communicates are not themselves present. This means that—contra Darwin’s failure to 
perceive it as such—the question of evolution, is a question of communication, of 
knowledge construction. 
Any attempt to investigate or speak of “mental” phenomena had to include 
supernaturalism, as ideas and feelings were unintelligible to the senses, too alive and 
unpredictable to lie still on the Procrustean bed of logic. The mind-body split, the 
reductionism of mind as tangential to the physical forces and chemical reactions of the 
‘material’ world, formed only one half of the paradox. For on the other side, that which 
was categorized as the somatic, palpable, and embodied was simultaneously denigrated 
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and tyrannized by the free and rigorous mastery of infinite mind. With the 
epistemological framework of 20th and 21st century scientific criticism, it seems 
‘evident’ to the contemporary thinker that the mind-matter split was a leveraging tool to 
construct new forms of power and distribution of order, where that which is relegated to 
‘matter,’ namely embodied and positionally overdetermined subjects such as women, 
children, the racially, nationally, economically, sexually ‘othered,’ is expedient to the 
rational, unrestrained, transcendent mind of man. A linear, mechanistic, dualistic model 
must construct arbitrary punctuations in order to postulate that an objectively observable 
and determinable line of causality and reality exists, thus losing the intricacies of 
positionalities, explanations, and hypotheses that could be emergent. Furthermore, the 
split envisions the subject as comprised of a dominant mind that not only controls ‘the 
rest’—i.e. the body—, but which owns the body.  What is owned under capitalism is 138
positioned to be sold, and the presupposition of selling—in reality—is to alienate it, to 
render it other.  
Bateson posits that once one has (unconsciously) correlated the immanence of the ‘self’ 
with the ‘body’ in order to establish the transcendence, non-corporeality or anti-
relationality of the ‘mind,’ one constructs a mind-body problem. This is indeed a nasty, 
persistent double-bind in which no satisfactory premises or conclusions can emerge 
through the epistemology which produced it. Likewise, the Cartesian coordinates and 
their axioms may be perfectly consistent, but they generate Gödelian paradoxes that may 
be true but cannot be ‘proved’ by the axioms that are produced. Oppositions enter into a 
kind of ontological competition with their other, destroying each other and their shared 
environment in the process, and so on: 
We begin to see some of the epistemological fallacies of Occidental 
civilization. In accordance with the general climate of thinking in 
 Since the Lockian view of society and the individual, the concept of the body as property of the ‘self’ has 138
been pervasive in our society. Locke writes in the Second Treatise on Civil Government, “through the death and 
all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has 
any right to but himself.” (27, 1690). 
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mid-nineteenth century England, Darwin proposed a theory of natural 
selection and evolution in which the unit of survival was either the 
family line or the species or subspecies or something of that sort. But 
today it is quite obvious that this is not the unit of survival in the real 
biological world. The unit of survival is organism plus environment. 
We are learning by bitter experience that the organism which destroys 
its environment destroys itself.  139
This error in punctuation propogates an “ecology of bad ideas,” a dominating system of 
weeds “branching out like a rooted parasite through the tissues of life and everything 
goes into a rather peculiar mess.”  In other words, the larger system is driven insane, 140
and its insanity is incorporated and transmitted to, or inherited by, the system of ‘my’ 
thoughts and experience. The “unit of survival” in the biological world straddles an 
entangled and circuitous ‘both-and’ that makes difference, and therefore reproduction, 
possible.  
Science in the 20th century can be described in terms of a paradigmatic confrontation, 
namely with the persistence of Cartesian dualisms as an epistemological hindrance rather 
than an instrumental apparatus for scientific progress. Science became a venue for 
experiencing the therapeutic and symptomatic (counter)paradoxes, that is, the 
entanglements of double-binds, that emerge when central epistemological premises of the 
discipline constructed around and with the presupposed split of coordinates turn out to be 
fundamentally erraneous. In Anthony Wilden’s words: “Epistemology is a question of 
where you draw the line, and there are only a restricted number of loci through which to 
draw it (i.e., everything in this paper has somehow been said before). The line drawn 
between ‘organism’ and ‘environment’ by our conventional model of reality is such a 
Gregory Bateson, “Pathologies of Epistemology,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. 139
Co., 1972),., 491.
 Ibid., 492. 140
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line, and, like all such lines it is a fiction. Unfortunately, we think that it is real.”  At the 141
level of our everyday verbal language, the usage of the verb ‘to be’ to talk about matters 
of relationships demonstrates how certain languages condemn its user to the law of 
identity, the identifications of ‘is’ that distort and destroy orders of abstraction. Alfred 
Korzybski, the Polish mathematician, engineer, and founder of general semantics, posited 
that since Aristotle, the elementalistic premises underlying human relations within the 
logic implied in subject-predicate languages have not changed at all, no matter how 
technically advanced the culture was.  This was the central premise from which general 142
semantics began: in the structure of these languages, methods, 'habits of thought,’ 
orientations, etc., delusional, even psychopathological factors are preserved and 
transmitted into objects and actions. Korzybski proclaimed that: “The Aristotelian 
structure of language is in the main elementalistic: it implies through structure a split or 
separation of what in actuality cannot be separated. For instance, we can verbally split 
‘body’ and ‘mind,’ ‘emotion’ and ‘intellect,’ ‘space’ and ‘time,’ etc., which as a matter of 
fact cannot be separated empirically and can be split only verbally.”  To borrow from 143
Lacanian vocabulary, the material differences of the symbiotic and Symbolic whole are 
systemically reified into Imaginary, unmediated oppositions. “Whatever you say a thing 
is, it is not,” “Words are not the unspeakable objective level containing the actual objects 
outside of our skin and the personal feelings inside our skin,” “The map is not the 
territory” : these are some of the Korzybskian axioms that Bateson began studying the 144
structure of patterns as a complex set of relations, steps towards a topology of complexity 
and recursivity. In the processual, recursive model, one cannot inquire about the 
‘meaning’ of a word without seeing the arcs of dependency upon the ‘meaning’ of other 
Anthony Wilden, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange (London: Tavistock 141
Publications, 1972), 219.
Alfred Korzybski, Selections from Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and 142
General Semantics, 2nd ed. (LA Bergne, TN: Lightning Source Inc., 2010). 
 Ibid., 12. 143
 By maps, Korzybski meant anything and everything that humans formulate with symbols, ‘things’ that are 144
only maps of what they purport to represent. All branches of science, all religions, all theories, all books,  
including this body of writing. No map represents all of ‘its’ presumed territory, meaning maps are self-
reflexive: every map is at least a map of the map-maker: her/his assumptions, skills, worldview, life-experience, 
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words used in defining it. A non-exploitative and recursive epistemology remains aware 
of its own epistemological acts and epiphenomenal modifications, a notion of fantasy and 
knowing that William Blake had two centuries prior: “Can a Poet doubt the Visions of 
Jehovah? Nature has no Outline; / But Imagination has. Nature has no Time; but 
Imagination has. / Nature has no Supernatural, and dissolves; / Imagination is 
Eternity.”  145
It seems that the immediate fact of monologue and lecture in the academic context, the 
belief that I can sit here in my desk using my unilateral mind to think things and 
purposively get somewhere with it is derivative from the premise that the mind controls 
the body. When a psychotherapist lapses into unilateral therapy, falling into the same old 
patterns of prescriptive, self-satisfied hypocrisy, she is obeying the same premise and 
thereby trapping herself and the patient in a mistaken epistemology that produces the 
false belief that either one of them can dominate the system and have power over it. 
Bateson writes: “A paradox is a contradiction in which you take sides—both sides. Each 
half of the paradox proposes the other.”  Both academia and psychotherapy are contexts 146
in which one must learn how to navigate paradoxical situations in order to participate in 
the context at all. Do not solve the paradox: the choice not to choose, to not act, is indeed 
a form of actively participating in the maintenance or cultivation of the paradox or 
counterparadox’s fruitful strife and variance. Confronting both sides of the paradox as the 
tension is still immanent and living entails a sort of initiation or passage into unfamiliar, 
perhaps even phantasmagorical territory that may attempt to synthesize the coordinates, 
to ‘see both sides’ as part of one resonating system. And perhaps the fantasy we may 
 William Blake, “The Ghost of Abel,” Prose writings (London: MacMillan and Co., 1880). 145
 Gregory Bateson and Stewart Brand, “Both Sides of the Necessary Paradox,” II Cybernetic Frontiers 146
(Random House, 1st. ed., 1974), 31. “A paradoxical situation can be described, perhaps as uncomplicated a 
possible, as existing between love and hate, in which both love and hate are going to be present. To choose to 
either love or hate presupposes the exclusion of the other, and to do this willingly, to exclude one hand of the 
Hegelian dialectic—as opposed to clinging to the dialectic and going on to the next synthesis whatever it may 
be.”
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foster as a site for attraction and play, and can help you “come out knowing something 
you didn’t know before, something about the nature of where you are in the universe.”  147
Ibid.147
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3. Searching for Resonance Amidst the Noise 
« Metalogue: All this noise » 
Daughter: I can't distinguish anything from the noise.  
Father: Well, how do we distinguish anything from any other form of variety?  
D: We identify, make categories, and insert away. We experience one sliver of the variety 
and race to claim the dominance of our knowledge. We also form metaphysical 
attachments to some isolated entities, and even try to put them into some identifiable 
relation, and call it love or hate.  
F: You’re in quite a mood… In the classical materialist sense, this ‘noise’ you speak of 
points to the fact of epistemologically separating random information from ‘meaningful’ 
matter-energy. Noise in this sense poses a question of the function and purposiveness of a 
communicational system, as well as their causal effects and end products. Yet to imagine 
otherwise, as a materialist, from this way of conceiving the world we live in, at 
ecological, social, interpersonal and aesthetic dimensions, seems to be what is muddling 
with your head.  
D: “I don’t think I can find a way to make it on this Earth…!” 
F: Again, with your rowdy music…  
D: What is crucial to me, both introduced from and emergent through the work of 
Bateson and ‘my’ rowdy music, is the notion that resonating systems at all overlapping 
scales must be defined as systems marked by a responsivity to noise. Perhaps its ability to 
remember noise, to glean structure at the very edge of chaos that tempts to dissolve it—
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whether forcefully in violence or willingly in ecstasy, or somewhere in between—is 
embedded in its very process.  
 “To hide one can forget, or pretend to forget another happening, or distort. They 
are all just good methods of bettering away from the truth that might be bitter.”  The 148
bitter truth of the logic of resonance emerges simultaneously with its sweeter one: that 
any attempt at hearing the sound of potential health requires a troubling, perhaps even 
scathing look into the presuppositional groundwork on which one has planted one’s feet.  
F: You are missing the second part of that insight, where the doctor is “cleverly 
reminded” by her patient of what she has left out: “Another camouflage is to blame it all 
on someone else. It keeps you from have to face what they really did to you, and what 
you did yourself and are still doing.”  Noise does not necessarily remain as noise, 149
perhaps necessarily cannot remain as noise if one is not to reproduce a communicative 
pattern of militant recrimination or self-validation. 
D: Noise is a necessary product of the tension between levels of scale, the recursive 
circles of deferred difference between various subsystems outside us and the logical types 
within our own communication. Or to put it another way, noise does not remain as noise, 
but a necessary existence for any sort of interpretation, at observing pattern alive in 
myriad forms both within and without the boundaries of the skin. 
F: When I was in school, a long, long time ago, to say that noise exists as relations 
between the participants would have sedimented some thick layers of confusion in the 
labs and classrooms. Although, what this brings to my mind is that we cannot believe of 
ecosystems and a litter of puppies and our own bodies as a perfect Newtonian concord of 
entities and forces. We may call this a groundbreaking loss of innocence: the system 
cannot recognize itself (its relationships) as the source of the noise which disturbs and 
Frieda-Fromm Reichmann, Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy (University of Chicago Press, 148
1960), 94-95. 
 Ibid. 149
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evolves it. We were just on the cusp of arriving at such developments in our department, 
but with the immanence of the political uprising and other forms of miscellaneous chaos 
looming in the background, I had to leave to make a living for you and your brother… 
D: We have both grown older, but nothing has really changed since then. To put it as 
simply as I can (mostly for my sake, honestly), all this noise about noise leads me to a 
central premise I wish to return to, that there is an immanent connection between the 
various, seemingly unrelated contexts within which you or I communicate with each 
other and others. And resonance is the word I give to the seeming un-relatedness that still 
manages to form a vibratory exchange between things in the head of the person who 
bears witness to and participates in the exchange. And this may be a useful metaphor for 
an epistemological process that cultivates an attention to context and lattices of 
relationships beneath the sound of our own words, our distinct intellectual playgrounds 
and educations. Not all metaphors are resounding, not all connections lustfully deep, but 
perhaps that is precisely the insight that needs to be gleaned in our culture and ecology 
heavily impacted by our habit of employing our conscious purpose for immediate 
gratification. At a level where gestures are immanent in the body and meaning is not 
made verbally obvious, a new way of doing science and art and policy-making can begin 
to be conceived—which mimics, not suffocates, the fluidly formed and formatively 
fluctuating, non-verbal (but not non-communicating) and emergent nature of the natural 
world. 
F: Those are some fine words, but how do you explain this to your uncle or grandma? 
They are so curious as to what you are devoting your whole youth to, and I am always 
tongue-tied for you.  
D: That is the central problem here, Dad, and a main source of all this noise. The skein of 
words which we have learned the ‘precise’ meaning of since we were schoolboys and 
girls turn out to be the one of the greatest lies we’ve ever been told. What my words are 
to me is not what they mean to you; they never are. I just saw an interview of a troubled 
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man saying that Hitler’s doctrine and life’s work ‘resonated’ with him, or a moneyed 
representative of Monsanto saying their “Modern Agriculture” is truly ‘resonant’ of our 
times… And so on.  
 I could write pages and pages of what rings true and immanent to me in this 
moment in time, and to those men or my uncle or even you—all to varying degrees of 
course—it will be nothing but convoluted jargon in a foreign language. It seems so 
obvious that if I impose upon or take for granted a language I have acquired via my life 
experiences in the vocabulary and frame of reference of another, then all conversation 
comes to an end, and yet…  
F: What is deemed most ‘obvious’ is the least perceptible, let alone enacted upon in a 
context that is in the most need of its teachings.  
D: But you know, we are still here still speaking to one another, entwining the structures 
of our thoughts, making the effort to find some sort of common ground, some sort of 
mutual resonance. How do I describe my desires without relinquishing their body-level 
significance? How do I speak in a way that rings true to me but still connects me to uncle 
and grandma? To mom and to my committee? To the friends I remember in my childhood 
and the friends in the cubicles beside me?  
F: I don’t have any answers for you, but it seems that everything you do with your time 
here depends upon you finding a way to do a lot of shape-shifting, without, at least to a 
degree of irrevocable distortion, shifting the shape of what could be gleaned from your 
messages. But then again, any kind of multiplicity or potentiality for complexity entails 
some level of what we call ‘distortion’… 
  It’s not like you can dance your work to your audience, whoever that may be 
comprised of, and let them see what they will. You’ve always been a terrible dancer. On 
the other hand, however, even gestural movement is comprised of a language of its own, 
and so your problem remains to be unsolved.  
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 I am neither your advisor nor your therapist, but it seems to me from this 
particular vantage point that you must not lose sight or hearing of what you love, what 
moves you, resonates with you, and what has brought you here in the first place. This is 
nothing academically insightful, for I do not have your brains or vocabulary, but as a 
father concerned for her daughter’s relative sanity I wish to give you this verbal reminder.  
 And the more eloquent words of your ‘favourite teacher’ that you urged me to 
read also echoes in my head… 
  Out in the desert and horrible places, there is a lot of stuff which 
is true within its very narrow limits. It’s called behavioural modification, 
it’s called behaviourism, it’s called Skinner, it’s called by other 
opprobrious terms. And these matters of study that they’ve worked on, you 
know, are worth studying. Trouble begins, though, when you find, of the 
pigeons being put into the Skinner boxes, that first of all there is a rule in 
the lab that nobody but a particular lady is allowed to handle the pigeons, 
and secondly the graduate students and Ph.D.s emphatically are not 
allowed to handle their pigeons; they just write the schedules. And then 
you find that the pigeons adore the lady who puts them in the boxes, that 
they swoon with pleasure in her hands. And this part of the story is not in 
general recorded in the research results. Because love, you see, is not what 
it is supposed to be all about. It just happens to be one of the things that it 
is all about. Right. There is, therefore, obviously not only a learning to 
peck prime numbers on discs or whatever it is, there is also a learning to 
peck prime numbers in a context whose shape is related to love. Stone 
walls do not a prison make, yes, nor iron bars a cage, but love will find a 
way somehow.  150
Carl Rogers, Dialogues: Conversations With Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, B.F. Skinner, Gregory 150
Bateson, Michael Polanyi, Rollo May, and Others (Houghton Mifflin; 1st edition, 1989), 183. 
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« i. Patterns of search » 
I made wine from the lilac tree 
Put my heart in its recipe 
It makes me see what I want to see 
And be what I want to be  151
A song vibrates in my head. It is a song about want and regenerative feedback, consumed 
in the schismogenic process of increased polarization. Torn in either extreme direction of 
illness or euphoria, of one heightening the need for the other, our protagonist is always in 
need of more—and the more he seems to have, the more he seems to feel. He begins by 
relating his story of being lost outside of his body in the night. He is entranced by a lilac 
tree, and therefore proceeds to harvest it. The truth remains that the tree has nothing to do 
with his experience of aesthetic delight, for it is the idea of the woman that he imbues the 
tree with that is the cause of his intoxication. It is the wine that he willingly makes and 
consumes from the tree that affects him so, and he takes strange pleasure in observing 
that he “cannot see clearly” and “feels unsteady,” and eventually ends his story lamenting 
at the tree for feeling “unready” for the complexities of finding meaning in his 
surroundings or his dreams, for his desire to learn and control, for his love. He is 
incapable of verbalizing, at least in the framework of the song, that the regenerative cycle 
of suffering and gratification is, and will never be quite enough. It is his inability to 
recognize the cybernetic relations immanent in his experience under the lilac tree that 
distances him from any kind of body-level significance to his wine, and he succumbs to a 
moment of intoxicated runaway.  
The translatability of the dynamics of recursive systems into the texture of the language 
with which they are spoken about is complicated by the relational interactions within 
processes of non-verbal communication that precede the emergence of various ideas 
within an investigation. In other words, to investigate upon various models of 
 “Lilac Wine” was written by James Shelton in 1950, and recorded by many artists including Eartha Kitt, 151
Nina Simone, and Jeff Buckley. The illusory and projective nature of the song retains the same intoxicated and 
utterly male fantasy at the source of its inspiration: in the 1925 novel Sorrow in Sunlight (first published in 
America as Prancing N****r), author Ronald Firbank fantasizes the main character, Miami Mouth, gliding 
through her party “offering a light, lilac wine, sweet and heady.”
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relationship, one must be met with a theory of parts and wholes that exist at the 
boundaries of the literal and symbolic, of recursive systems and difference, as well as 
“the relation between name and that which is named,” with which to begin the endeavour 
of understanding the implications of an meta-epistemological, non-deterministic 
science.  It is with an ongoing examination of our applications of conscious purpose 152
that we may begin to re-route the habits of control and production that distort the 
recursiveness of the natural systems we are embedded in, seeking to destroy natural 
complexity for the sake of an endlessly goal-meeting, optimizing and achieving way of 
being. The protagonist’s double bind of willingly consuming the wine thus producing 
himself as the wine’s end-product is my metaphor for the global double bind that 
industrial capitalism is ensnared in: if it stops its production, it will destroy itself; if it 
goes on producing it will destroy ‘us.’  It is from the difference between the production 153
and consumption of lilac wine and the systemic life of the lilac tree that I would like to 
begin relating an understanding of resonance. Bateson notes that an examination of 
abductive relatedness would entail some sort of engagement in as paradoxical a process 
as the initial double bind that poses itself as the central problem. Our task, namely, is to 
construct a “therapeutic double bind” that creates the space, the ‘emergent metasystem’ 
from which to navigate the pathology-on-the-surface. The ‘therapeutic double bind’ deals 
with matters of unconscious epistemology (“the how of using our senses”), where the 
conscious purpose that stabilizes and secures a conception of ‘self’ is deeply at odds with 
Alfred Korzybski, Selections from Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and 152
General Semantics, 2nd ed. Institute of General Semantics, 1994 (first published 1948), vii. 
Polish mathematician Alfred Korzybski defined “semantic reactions” as the human evaluational responses to 
verbal and non-verbal stimuli in connection with their personal meanings (i.e. their ‘thinking-feeling,’ psycho-
logical reactions). The relation between the name and that which is named is one of structure (a pattern that 
connects), which he defines as a body of relations which are essential factors in the culmination and emergence 
of meaning. Korzybski’s general semantics exemplifies that language, any formulation system is a map of what 
it purports to represent, and “the map is not the territory.” No map represents all of ’its’ presumed territory, but 
at best, maps may be self-reflexive, meaning that we can map our maps indefinitely so that we see the map as a 
map of the mapmaker, swayed and injured by his or her assumptions, education, experience, etc. 
 Anthony Wilden, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange (London: Tavistock 153
Publications, 1972), 394.  
Wilden adds this Marxist perspective on such an attempt at self-reflexive, ‘irrational’ and life-like logic: “The 
logic of this pathology is that through unlimited expropriation, capital expropriates itself. Through unlimited 
imposition of order and organization, it drives the biosphere and the sociosphere to disorder and 
disorganization. Capital thus becomes equivalent to rigidity, to bound energy, to waste; in human affairs capital 
is the principle of entropy.” 
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the workings of the external world.  It is precisely at the moment of double-binding 154
experience that disrupts and shakes our “safe illusions” about the self that we come closer 
to an awareness of the deep premises that form our perceptual processes, that we can 
begin to engage in a habit of self-reflexivity at the level of our body. We too, will come to 
notice that we “cannot see clearly” and “feel unsteady,” but perhaps we will be more 
equipped to be ready to accept insights about the self and the world as they emerge. 
Perhaps, at best, we would come to a recognition that such an experience with lilac wine 
is not deleterious in itself; yet in the context of an epistemology which is rigid in its 
acceptance, and thereby pathologizes its existence, the experience of unsteadiness 
becomes an experience of decadence. 
Resonance is the beginning of a vocabulary for a way of conceiving our conceptions and 
creations as the record of our observations of occurrences outside in the world. Bateson 
has proposed one interpretation of resonance as a process of sensitizing perception 
towards the interconnectivity of events and ideas through his notion of “patterns of 
search,” the epistemological habits of the participant that may heighten or distort the 
skein of her recursive activity within the phenomenal world.  Bateson would perhaps 155
say that we ‘resonate with things’ with a learned and preplanned (although largely 
unconscious) setlist about what resonates with what, in what sort of context, to what sort 
of consequences, and so on. 
The question of whether these resonance pre-exist, becoming subjects only in the mind of 
the subject that forms the connection, evokes the age-old Kantian and Berkeleyan 
philosophical toy that asks: ’Is the tree there in the wood when I am not there to see it?’ 
Yet Bateson argues that because our lives “do not have that objective character which has 
been a source of reassurance to the natural scientists since the days of Locke and 
Newton,” such thought experiments may have their purpose in an context where such 
 Gregory Bateson, “The Birth of a Matrix,” in A Sacred Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind, ed. 154
Rodney E. Donaldson (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 206. 
 Gregory Bateson, “The Message of Reinforcement” in A Sacred Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 155
ed. Rodney E. Donaldson (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 140-141. 
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play is accustomed but indeed pigeonholes or stagnates the actual patterns of search that 
attempt to understand the phenomenal world.  A more relevant and fruitful frame of 156
inquiry remains to be the "very profound and irresistible ‘discovery’ that the laws and 
processes of our perception are at a bridge which joins us inseparably to that which we 
perceive—a bridge which unifies subject and object.”  Because science, at best, informs 157
how the contexts in which things are to be observed are constructed, we must take into 
account how observation itself cannot be detached or isolated from a notion of self-
reflexive participation. This means that for anybody who works in the sciences or in the 
arts, every new discovery and every new advance about the world is an exploration of the 
self—one’s own central presuppositions, unexamined beliefs, the personal and cultural 
kernels of information we take and hold onto as true. This means that the sort of 
information relevant to matters of communication, difference, learning, ‘mind,’ etc., is 
only accessible (and therefore potentially useful) through the quality or relevance of the 
participating subject’s search patterns, their ability to acquire information at a 
particularly higher order or level of complexity, and even simultaneously at various levels 
of complexity. The propositions and premises that the subject ‘sees the world’ though, 
believes and therefore acts through and upon, therefore, is namely a matter of habit 
formation: the shared patterns of behaviour and ‘programmed’ reinforcement of the 
whole system (the individual in relation to other individuals in a shared context and 
environment). 
If ‘scientific discovery’ is defined as a record of an individual’s observations in context, 
then science itself is nudged towards an embodied enactment of ideas in the phenomenal 
world. We may begin to see the scientist’s ideas as reflections of larger parts and patterns 
of the world outside of the boundaries of her body, which also attempt to venture outside 
of her immediate intellectual context. Bateson found the search patterns of the scientist’s 
own investigation as synonymous with a responsivity to the “patterns that connect,” and 
 Gregory Bateson, “Language and Psychotherapy: Frieda Fromm-Reichmann’s Last Project” in A Sacred 156
Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind, ed. Rodney E. Donaldson (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 
1991), 245.
Ibid., 246.157
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framed his lifelong work as a multidisciplinary thinker with this question of search 
patterns in sync with the world it seeks to know:  
Break the pattern which connects the items of learning and you 
necessarily destroy all quality. […] What pattern connects the crab to 
the lobster and the orchid to the primrose and all four of them to me? 
And me to you? And the six of us to the amoeba in one direction and 
to the back-ward schizophrenic in another? I want to tell you why I 
have been a biologist all my life, what it is that I have been trying to 
study. What thoughts can I share regarding the total biological world 
in which we live and have our being? How is it put together?  158
Bateson’s formulation of this problem attempts to describe and embody an epistemology 
of a therapeutic double-bind at various scales of experience and ‘crisis.’ Such an 
epistemology puts a homological perception of symmetrical and complementary patterns 
(or “meta-patterns”)—located within the inbetweenity of seemingly distinct entities—at 
the forefront of any investigation of any ‘thing,’ any part of the whole of the external 
world. In other words, the “patterns that connect” search for the conscious or unconscious 
resonance between ‘things’ at various, often overlapping and simultaneous orders, in 
order to perceive and think in accordance to, and perhaps towards the protection of, the 
systemic nature of the world at large. Bateson’s “patterns that connect” asks aesthetic and 
ethical questions (“How are you related to this creature? What pattern connects you to 
it?”) towards an emergent conception of ‘self’ as a participant in her “relevance” to her 
company, her many contexts and environments.  159
Bateson further relates his story about “thinking in terms of stories” that draw attention to 
the necessary entanglement and ongoing concurrence of human ‘thinking’ and the multi-
ordinal organization of the natural world. A man asks his “private large computer” if it 
Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), 8. 158
 Ibid., 10. 159
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can ever “think like a human being.” The machine then proceeds to print onto a piece of 
paper, “THAT REMINDS ME OF A STORY.” Nested within this story is the central 
insight of Mind and Nature: a notion of ‘mind’ as the recursive interaction of any self-
corrective, systemic tautology, in which there is no separation between the eidetic 
participation of the ‘perceiving subject’ in the natural world and in their contexts in 
general, the mental-material trajectory of recursive events that one is implicated in. Here, 
Bateson defines a story as “a little knot or complex of that species of connectedness 
which we call relevance,” and goes on to say: “Now I wanted to show that whatever the 
word story means in the story which I told you, the fact of thinking in terms of stories 
does not isolate human beings as something separate from the starfish and the sea 
anemones, the coconut palms and the primroses. Rather, if the world be connected, if I 
am at all fundamentally right in what I am saying, then thinking in terms of stories must 
be shared by all mind or minds, whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea 
anemones.”   In this sense, perhaps we can conceive of resonance as a network of 160
stories, gesturing me towards you, connected by nodes of narrative gesturing and 
communication at increasing scalar complexity. Resonance is the coexistence of multiple 
metaphors, an act of participating in a process of bringing ‘me’ outside of ‘myself’ 
through my own perception of my ‘mind’ as part of a larger circularity of interwoven 
metaphors. 
Bateson’s notion of ‘patterns of search’ and the ‘patterns that connect’ in his theory of a 
natural history of human epistemology and ‘mind’, however, presupposes a tricky 
paradox: the ability to obtain information about patterning and redundancy in the world 
depends upon the subject’s particular habits of perception, yet these habits are only 
formed through the body of experiencing and receiving such information always at some 
level removed from the patterns of redundancies immanent in the environment and 
material world. In other words, the search patterns of the observer that seek resonance 
between things must silence or quiet down the noises of its own findings in order to 
arrive at some kind of ‘access point’ in the resonating system. Bateson writes: “The 
 Ibid.160
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organism must, if it can, learn to look in the right places, in the right order, for the right 
sorts of information. Consequently, it is caught in a limited view of the universe by its 
search patterns, insofar as these are rigidly defined and unchanging. No pattern of the 
universe which cannot be discovered by these patterns can exist for that organism.”   161
Like lilac wine, my search patterns are inclined to show me what I desire, to give me my 
own permission to go about life with my habits undisrupted, free from any entanglement 
in forms of learning that may be difficult and painful. The schizophrenic patient that 
taught Bateson about the pathological habit of a rigid denial of pathology would 
wholeheartedly agree, when she said: “If the Russians (Chinese, minorities, hippies, 
students, etc.) aren’t what I think they are, I’ll prove it.”  It is through our search 162
patterns that chords of relation and coherence are able to be heard, and it is also our 
search patterns that entrap our music in a self-same, unreflexive reproduction of the same 
old sound. The process of seeking and creating resonance between things, then, requires 
an understanding at a certain level of complexity of the process of how contextual 
regularities at the level of presuppositions in the mind have been established, and to what 
end these patterns are then applied to events that occur in life.  
 Gregory Bateson, “The Message of Reinforcement” in A Sacred Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 161
ed. Rodney E. Donaldson (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 141.
 Ibid., 145. 162
Bateson speaks to the schizophrenic process of an ideological paranoia of symmetry, which is related to Freud’s 
reductionist and anti-contextual ‘narcissism of minor differences’ (Standard Edition, XVIII, 101). As Wilden 
puts it: “It is a necessary function of pathological communication to deny its own pathology at some level while 
admitting and using [it] at other levels” (212). The ability to receive information on, and perhaps somehow 
communicate about the resonances in question, are dependent upon the sort of habits of perception that allow 
for such observation and communication. The absence or distortion of such habits of perception enables security 
in its distance separated from the moving chaos of the resonating system. 
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« ii. Flexibility, stress, and hard-programming » 
You are now parting with the food that sustained you—all the secrets and the secret 
powers—and no other nourishment has yet appeared to replace it. This is the hardest 
time of all, harder than even your sickness was before you came here. At least that had a 
meaning for you, as awful as the meaning was sometimes. You will have to trust me 
enough to take on faith that the new food, when it comes will be richer. 
— Frieda-Fromm Reichmann  163
A theory of resonance requires an awareness that no one person can hear all the messages 
at once, and that certain sorts and orders of information and redundancy will be more 
accessible to certain search patterns and yet inaccessible to some. Furthermore, perhaps it 
is at the very locus of the uneven distribution of information that search patterns are 
allowed to move, flex out into conversation, participate in a process of entanglement with 
other search patterns to collaborate on new ‘music.’ Because I cannot be moved, disturbed 
or changed by what I cannot perceive or become aware of, it is through the very necessity 
of this unevenness, this ‘deafness’ to certain patterns, that my “hard programmed” 
knowledge allows itself to be seduced by some sort of ‘otherness.’ Bateson has often 
employed the engineer’s terminology of ‘programming’ towards an understanding of a 
flexibility of ideas: since any social system is comprised of ideas of all logical types, it is 
an active analysis to those conscious and unconscious ideas that are shared (and 
deliberately differentiated) in various subsystems of the society that plays a centrifugal 
force in becoming aware, and therefore attempting to change, the theory and practice of 
the society at large. 
It is this diversity of degrees of generality that determine a “economy of flexibility,” 
which poses a contrast in how repeated, habitual ideas and unfamilar new ideas are 
“handled” by the mental system, the ecology of ideas of a given society. Bateson writes: 
“It is commonly the more generalized and abstract ideas that survive repeated use. The 
more generalized ideas thus tend to become premises upon which other ideas depend. 
Hannah Green, I Never Promised You A Rose Garden (New York City: Henry Holt & Co, 1964), 110. 163
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These premises become relatively inflexible.”  To put this idea in context, the theorist 164
or “ecological analyst” is placed in a double-binding experience of having to push for that 
which will allow the system a positive budget of flexibility; and on the other hand, having 
to deal with the people and institutions that “have a natural propensity eat up all available 
flexibility.”  The theorist must adhere to the system’s current budget of flexibility in his 165
findings for even the potential of them being followed at all; yet the theorist participates 
in a state of a chronic shortage of the current budget, with more cuts being made by the 
minute, severing the development of flexibility before it can even begin.  166
Habit formation in ideas presupposes a convenience to their usage; that is, the more 
inflexible and “hard-programmed” the idea, the more readily and speedily it bends to 
conscious purpose in a positive feedback loop of unchecked mutual support and self-
perpetuation. The evolutionary process of collective epistemology is constitutive of such 
entangled movement between this “economy of flexibility” and “ecology of mind,” 
where flexibility is defined as an “uncommitted potentiality for change.”  This may 167
offer accessibility to a mode of perception that is sensitive to the musical relations 
between things–yet is only possible with a concurrent awareness that denying the 
existence of flexibility in the phenomenal world in our human practices will instigate 
 Gregory Bateson, “Ecology and Flexibility in Urban Civilization,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San 164
Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1972), 510. 
 Ibid., 505.165
As a friend and former teacher once spoke to me, “You participate, as a human being, in this collective 166
tragedy of experiencing the collective tragedy as something simply located in the self. ‘Don’t get sucked in by 
bureaucratic process’—but also remember no one anywhere escapes the bureaucracy today, which is written in 
our hearts, and which no metalogue, however insightful, can be do more than reflect on.”
Gregory Bateson, “Ecology and Flexibility in Urban Civilization,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San 167
Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1972), 504-505. 
It is also at this interface that Bateson, following the work of Ross Ashby, defines a biological system as “the 
ecological system and the human civilization, and the system which is to be the combination of these two.”
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pathological consequences for the larger ecology, when enforced and applied with current 
technology.  168
Flexibility seeks out deviation in a system and allows for a process of neutralization or 
correction, characteristic also of the concept of negative feedback that cybernetics has 
identified as the primary control system of nature. Anthony Wilden’s term for such 
propensity for homeostatic self-sustainment is “renormalization,” drawing from 
biological models of predator-prey relations in simple ecosystems. “Every schoolboy 
knows” the dyadic relation between the wolf and the rabbit in their shared patch of land, 
where an increase in the population of rabbits will increase the population of wolves, 
which in turn eliminate the rabbits to disproportional numbers, which consequently 
eliminate the wolves. The metaphor of wolves eating the rabbits to their own starvation as 
“short-range adaptive flexibility” demonstrates an absence of flexibility and 
renormalisation in the limited environment, necessarily resulting in a “long-range 
counter-adaptive inflexibility.”  This principle of counter-adaptivity is derived in the 169
biology of evolution, but Wilden demonstrates its resonance within psychosocial or 
socioeconomic systems. At the levels of individual psychopathology and biosocial human 
maladjustment, the errors of “short-range adaptive flexibility” engender pathology at the 
level of ‘long-range,’ hard-programmed ideas about relating and communicating—often 
towards a surplus of stress in the whole system. This reminds us to consider that Wilden’s 
model of short-range adaptive flexibility as demonstrated in the binary model of the wolf 
and rabbit is situated within a much more complex, multiple and entangled model that is 
 Ibid., 498-499. 168
Bateson believed that an idea, if believed in by enough people with enough certainty and met with enough 
technical execution, will be able to produce cataclysmic ‘by-products’ in the biosphere at large. To paraphrase 
his model of “Dynamics of Ecological Crisis”: unchecked growth of population, technology, and “hubris”— 
belief in dominance over self, other, and planetary ecology—interconnects and accelerates into epiphenomena 
of famine, pollution, and war. “…The bigger the population, the faster it grows; the more technology we have, 
the faster the rate of new invention; and the more we believe in our ‘power’ over an enemy environment, the 
more ‘power’ we seem to have and the more spiteful the environment seems to be.” Human industrial growth 
has and will continue to expand, and eat what is left of planetary ecology. It seems, then, an increasing 
expansion of economic ‘freedom’ is utterly entwined with an increasing reduction of epistemological ‘wisdom.’ 
See fig. 1. 
 Anthony Wilden, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange (London: Tavistock 169
Publications, 1972), 206. 
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the ecology. The whole system does not only account for the rabbit or the wolf, or any 
singular species or population, but the oak tree that the rabbit finds shelter in, the fungi 
that nourishes the tree, the bear or mountain lion that feast upon the wolf, the carbon or 
soil pollution that affects the life of the whole forest, and so on. Stating the seemingly 
obvious fact of entangled ecology leads to a consideration of a much less obvious one: 
that of the intertwined precarity of adaptation, especially with human complicity 
increasingly at the forefront of altering the homeostatic balance of the ecological whole. 
Wilden writes: “The ‘security operation’ of madness is an adaptation to an intolerable 
environment—whether that environment be the family context, the value system of a 
particular culture, or social conditions—and it has at least short-range survival value. It is 
the beginning of the ‘cure.’ But if the ‘madman’ cannot break through at another level, 
his adaptation may be insignificant as far as his ‘environment’ is concerned…Worse, 
however, may be the situation in which his adaptation is essential also to the survival of 
the ‘environment’ which made him ‘lose his marbles,’ as they say, in the first place.”  170
Short-range ‘solutions’ that are akin to eating the next rabbit in sight, such as alcohol, 
hallucinations, pesticides, shopping, and burning fossil fuels only become counter-
adaptive and pathogenic when the context (which is always an epistemological structure) 
is wired towards increased deviation, runaway, and atomistic separation of mind from 
body. A context that constantly sends the message of blame to wolves for eliminating 
both the rabbits and themselves, or the schizophrenic for creating her own hallucinatory 
world, or the individual for global ecological destruction, the systemic, entangled, and 
profound nature of the problem will remain shrouded in murk. 
What the larger epistemology is unable to approach are the reasons for the adaptive 
adjustment in the first place, or, that which was ‘once’ an adaptive adjustment to a 
pathological pattern or painful situation. Efforts to alleviate a problem at a heightened 
moment of desperation (for health, for prosperity, for ‘normalcy,’ for love, etc.), then, is 
recontextualized as a (by)product of the same pathological pattern that it sought to 
escape. It is through an epistemology of cybernetics that Bateson describes the nature of 
 Ibid. 170
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addiction as an attempt at correction of a present situation of discomfort or anguish. The 
state of drunkenness offered by the bottle is precisely what allows the individual to 
“become again a part of the human scene,” experiencing a total shift in epistemology as 
his pain is reduced by the physiological and psychological warmth offered by the 
drink.  Those who experience chronic pain will attest to the jarring, life-altering 171
moment of experiencing its absence (or perhaps interpreting the bifurcation point of 
excess stress as ‘absence’). What is monstrous and pathogenic, however, is the 
individual’s perception of alcohol itself as a ‘thing’ separated from his body, that may 
enter in it and grant him a sense of ‘sanity’ through his intoxication: through the belief of 
a separation of his mind and body, what he is confronted with is not the dissonance and 
dissociation inherent in that concept, but a feeling of having his anxieties and despair 
uplifted in a state of fuzzy murk, a comforting sense of belonging in the here and now, 
and so on. What the individual becomes ‘addicted’ to, then, is not the drink itself but the 
symmetrical relationship of dependency with the substance that allows security in his 
hard programmed premises of individuated self-control, that grants him a sense of ‘self’ 
through an alleviation of the pain and confusion of being at odds with a larger system. 
Bateson identifies the myth of ‘willpower’—the belief that one can ‘defeat’ and maintain 
control over one’s relationship with the substance—as serving only to escalate and 
reinforce the positive feedback loop of pathogenic dependency by activating just enough 
discomfort to increase the behaviour which preceded the discomfort, i.e., to fall back into 
the same old pattern of drinking. In other words, what was to provide flexibility of 
behaviour or mental state in the painful context only becomes programmed to escalate 
and strengthen it, to feel ‘at home’ within messages of the impossibility of 
renormalization: the absence of a corrective control system, a conception of balance or 
moderation altogether. The double-binding premise of being a separated, self-contained 
and sustained individual that rightly possesses the power to give himself ‘a little 
something’ to go about his world ‘now and then,’ also operates as the premise of his own 
destruction. The more ‘fundamental’ the premise, however, the more ‘fundamental’ the 
Gregory Bateson, “The Cybernetics of Self: A Theory of Alcoholism,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San 171
Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1972), 329. 
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effects of the change in the world. Bateson writes: “If a man achieves or suffers change in 
premises which are deeply embedded in his mind, he will surely find out that the results 
of that change will ramify throughout his whole universe. Such changes we may well call 
‘epistemological.’”   172
Determining the kind of epistemological shift that ‘breaks through at another level’ of the 
original bind as a task for the individual to perform with their ‘innate strength’ or 
willpower only reproduces the original bind. To indeed ‘break through at another level,’ 
we must begin from enlarging the visibility of the scale of the bind’s processes and 
ramifications, to see them deliberately at a collective scale that is often obscured by the 
everyday illusion of ‘individual’ problems. Perhaps, then, we can go so far to say that any 
shift in the hard-programming of our ideas may involve change in the whole skein of 
relations at the level of the most basic cultural ideas of what is called a ‘civilization.’ 
Thomas S. Kuhn wrote of “paradigm shifts” in 1962 amidst a general boom of 
individuals in moving towards similar directions in questioning fundamentalism in 
science, in a paradigmatic turn towards recognizing that a state of flexibility and ‘non-
use’ differs from a state of “hard-programmed” commitment. This is largely because the 
concept of a “paradigm” provides the epistemological framework for the members of a 
scientific discipline to learn (or refuse to learn) the constructed and compounded, 
personal and contextually learned nature of the beliefs that they espouse. The originality 
of Kuhn’s formulations was to put a personal historico-epistemological emphasis on the 
acceptance and maintenance of ‘normal science’: simultaneously by external social need 
and an internal agenda, the structure of the scientific field itself (its theory and practice) is 
constructed as a hub for the scientist to increasingly accommodate their work to the 
existent paradigm, and to perform ‘mopping up operations,’ maintenance duties necessary 
to continue to exist in the preformed and relatively inflexible space that the paradigm 
supplies, no matter how secure. In other words, what the schoolboy is taught is not to 
follow a flux of knowledge but to know and master a paradigm, which mainly functions 
to prepare the schoolboy for “membership in that particular scientific community within 
 Ibid., 336. 172
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which he will later practice.”  Because of such membership that the schoolboy 173
‘invested’ his whole youth to obtain, and because he will participate in a pattern of 
relationships with men who have obtained their positions by adhering to the same 
models, his practices in the present and future will seldom, if not never, dare to tread in 
the land of overt disagreement about his ‘fundamentals.’ 
Yet the ‘fundamental’ question that Kuhn asks through his analysis of normal science, 
and therefore the emergent possibility of scientific revolution, resonates with Bateson’s 
problem of suffering change in one’s deepest premises: “What beliefs about the stars, for 
example, does he bring to the study of chemistry or electricity? Which of the many 
conceivable experiments relevant to the new field does he elect to perform first? And 
what aspects of the complex phenomenon that then results strike him as particularly 
relevant to an elucidation of the nature of chemical change or electrical affinity?”  It is 174
precisely at the point of painful entanglement of personal presuppositions and 
collectively shared messages about scientific-epistemological development that one 
begins to understand every description as necessarily partial, that no personal or natural 
history can be interpreted without a body of methodological beliefs permitting selection, 
emphasis, and storytelling, and that it is precisely from the parts that are omitted from and 
by one’s methodological beliefs that the important resonations and connections emerge. 
« iii. the observer-participant » 
“Oppositions are not subject to the logic of exclusion, but to that of participation, of which 
exclusion is in any case a variant.” 
— Louis Hjelmslev  175
 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, fourth ed. (Chicago and London: The University of 173
Chicago Press, 2012), 11. 
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The notion of resonance I have begun to offer here is an effort to communicate the urgent 
necessity of complicating our patterns of search. I have attempted to demonstrate that this 
task is entwined with the process of cultivating an economy of flexibility in the structure 
of our language, which may engender a fluency for complexity in articulating the 
complexities of the social and global scale problems that we face. With resonance comes 
a sensitivity to ‘strange attractors’ that preludes new generalizations, organization, and 
relationships, navigating the emergent fractal structures of participation from which we 
may diverge but never quite depart. Resonance may then help to construct a metaphor of 
intervention as a model with which to see the dialogic emergence of cultural 
presuppositions, and their ongoing interchange in the formation of our organizational 
policies and institutions.  
Furthermore, such a metaphor, which proclaims observance as inseparable from 
interwoven participation alongside and with that which is observed, provides a persistent 
reminder for the present moment of Bateson’s famous statement: “Science never proves 
anything.”  This primary premise that ‘every schoolboy knows’ repeats the ‘simple’ 176
truth that a linear, positivistic way of explanation does not work, and our capacity to 
explain things depends upon our ability (which is possible only within contexts that allow 
the ability) to reach for relations, to make connections in ‘non-obvious’ places, and to 
extend awareness of the inescapable reality of having to operate inside structures 
endlessly overlapping. Tolly Holt’s description of ‘occurrence systems’ during the 1968 
conference in Burg Wartenstein on the effects of conscious purpose on human adaptation, 
as documented by Mary-Catherine Bateson, provides a branching out of the metaphor of 
knowledge as situated between overlapping occurrences, which may aid in the difficult 
understanding of the structure of epistemological change. Holt arrives at a potent 
metaphor for resonance in his description of participants as parts of the whole that is a 
musical event, sifting through a space where ‘strange attractors’ are abundant and new 
chords of knowledge are therefore able to emerge: 
Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), 27. 176
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Anyway, can you imagine a kind of music that really has concurrence? 
Where there is a whole lot going on concurrently, which nevertheless is 
aesthetic and has musical relation, but no one observer can hear it all at 
once? If he could, it wouldn’t be concurrence. And all you can do at any 
one time is to focus on some part. Perhaps you can imagine being able to 
wander in this musical web. You could turn knobs or something to move 
about in this space. And indeed, a number of people could wander about 
in this space and perhaps even meet each other there.   177
In an occurrence system, it is precisely at the locus of one’s inability to experience the 
whole that one can begin to navigate it, that allows for the space for navigation in the first 
place. An awareness of such limitations keeps the system from becoming static, 
sustaining and continuously stimulating the concurrent nodes of resonance, of musical 
relation. Although the social sciences are increasingly studying the type of nonlineal, 
bifurcating, and recursive system that allows for the movement of ‘strange attractors’ as 
demonstrated by this occurrence model, what remains murky is the difficulty to 
‘visualize,’ to actually resonate with the often abstract language of chaos, fractal 
structures, and resonance. The language used to describe individual and collective scales 
of larger disordered processes beyond immediate understanding and control may in fact 
provide more obstacles towards their understanding. 
 It is by epistemological error that individuals and social systems fall into disturbing, 
often painful double-binds, and it is in response to these epistemological errors at a 
collective scale that the study of nonlinearity and complexity must begin. To sense the 
importance of music and vibration in what is done in scientific fields, to conceive of the 
premises of my individual struggle not as a byproduct of self-damning pathology, and to 
understand the destructive search patterns of conscious purpose by which invested groups 
deny and therefore destroy systemic complexity at social and ecological scales, are all 
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parts of the whole resonating system that embeds and connects the orchid and the 
primrose, the amoeba and the schizophrenic, me to you, and so on, into a larger 
resounding unity.  
Concurrence entails experiencing the kinds of complexities that emerge from the whole 
immanent in oneself, and it is to such realization that resonance within occurrence 
systems begins to hold in the ‘real world.’ As Mary Catherine Bateson writes: “Every 
person is his or her own metaphor… The possibility of seeing something, the possibility 
of talking about it, and probably the possibility of loving, depend in every case arriving in 
yourself at a comparable complexity.”  ‘I’ am my own metaphor that brings me closer 178
to an understanding of that which I failed to understand with staunch intention; it is 
‘your’ very existence that embodies that which you are trying to speak about in a 
language that can only exist at some level of a double-bind. And the beliefs about some 
part of the world that each of us bring to examinations of other parts of the world, that 
precise moment of overlap and difference, may be the moment where ‘you’ and ‘I’ meet. 
What Bateson partially meant by describing information as “a difference that makes a 
difference” is perhaps to emphasize this fact of encounter, of concurrence, in the 
communicative contexts that produce and reproduce what is thought to be known.  This 179
means that a restriction of search is necessary, but these restrictions can be various and 
many, as various and many as the emergent facets of one’s ‘self’ participating in 
interacting, adaptive being.  
Yet the people that we may meet in any one occurrence system will come into the system 
with their own metaphors. The fact of a different metaphor for any different interlocutor 
is perhaps the greatest insight and task that the vocabulary of resonance and the efforts to 
translate complexity will have to contend with. The possibility of knowledge as a 
rhythmic process that encounters the vibrations of other rhythmic processes in a 
polyphonic meeting of information and metaphors and ideas remains an unknown, 
 Ibid., 285.178
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perhaps even a fantasy as intoxicating as lilac wine ‘on a cool damp night.’ Yet, as 
Isabelle Stengers articulates, “although it does not yet have the ability to be ‘considered,’ 
must mark the way we present the present.”  In other words, it is towards a 180
confirmation not of what we think to already know, but the “incomplete access to the 
complexity that we are,” that we ‘handle’ ideas with aesthetic sensibility in their layered 
contexts, rather than by compulsion to arrive at a destination, consuming the object of 
knowledge in hand.  Amidst the many things that theory cannot do (cure illness, restore 181
natural ecologies, change people’s minds, etc.), it may, at best, provide a trajectory or 
sense of direction in becoming cognizant of the reverberating implications, causations, 
and consequences of such problems. What must be said, with the immanent fear of 
seeming to relinquish care, is that allowing for such venture to reverberate at a scale that 
is capable of marking the way we present the present is a task too unstable and unfolding, 
too systemic, for one theorist’s attempt at an abstract goal of ‘success.’ From here, 
Adrienne Rich provides some words from which we may begin: “Until we can 
understand the assumptions in which we are drenched we cannot know ourselves.”  182
The interface between different search patterns and the phenomena it attempts to ‘seek’ is 
possible, perhaps, only through a necessary process of participation. What must remain 
in awareness is that the word “participation” may evoke a muddled and often primitivist 
idealization of a kind of pastoral, ‘pre-logical’ immanence to human practices and affairs, 
which will be insufficient and erroneous for the task at hand. We are compelled, then, to 
describe “participation” within a domain of language, the fact of multi-scalar variety in 
communicating about the relationship within which communication takes place; that is, 
the metacommunication about the other who speaks and gestures towards the self, and 
vice versa. Such an understanding of participation may be seen in relation to analogic 
communication and therefore an analogic structure of thought contrasted to the digital. 
 Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 180
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This contrast clarifies the difference between using conventional signs (i.e. numbers, 
verbal words) to name a connection and the emergent quality of gesturing towards the 
connection through participating in the relationship at a non-verbal level. In Bateson’s 
own words, the difference between the digital and the analogic can be thought of as so: 
Verbal language is almost (but not quite) purely digital. The word 
“big: is not bigger than the world “little”; and in general there is 
nothing in the pattern (i.e., the system of interrelated magnitudes) in 
the word “table” while would correspond to the system of interrelated 
magnitudes in the object denoted. On the other hand, in kinetic and 
paralinguistic communication, the magnitude of the gesture, the 
loudness of the voice, the length of the pause, the tension of the 
muscle, and so forth—these magnitudes commonly correspond 
(directly or inversely) to magnitudes in the relationship that is the 
subject of discourse.  183
Within perception, if considered as the process that unites the participants of a 
communicative exchange, the fruit of that participatory observation will first and 
foremost resonate at the scale of each one’s body. The messages-gestures emergent and 
exchanged in participation can be seen as structures and models of the very soma they 
have originated from. A rudimentary digitalization of the analog, however, may include a 
process of viewing the dynamics and behaviour of analogic communication with digital 
categories of analysis which can produce erroneous and often detrimental outcomes to the 
participants. For example, the therapist obsesses on utilizing the verbal, literal words of 
the schizophrenic patient to determine what is going on, she will only create a context of 
communicating the inability to establish a basis of mutual understanding and respect. She 
must be able to communicate that there is nothing hallucinogenic about cultural and 
social context, about the inability to voice one’s pain, while being aware that to state it in 
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words as such may never suffice. Likewise, to apply a theory of logical types or 
abstraction to the way in which dolphins communicate would say nothing about the 
dolphins at all; and so it is to the danger of such a muddling of understanding that 
observation is seen without a concept of participation, of immanent engagement as part of 
a dynamic system of relationships. As Bateson further remarks, however: “In the natural 
world, communication is rarely either purely digital or purely analogic.”  Digitalization 184
is an inevitable, primary process in nature—as Bateson assumes genotypic variation to be 
purely digital—which has recently turned out not to be quite so simple (i.e. epigenetics), 
and which means that it may function or be ‘programmed’ towards maintaining a general 
analog relation. The survival of an ecosystem as a whole requires, to some extent, names 
and words with which to navigate its processes. At the scale of human biosocial 
problems, some processes of digitalization of the analog may, at best, cultivate a 
flexibility and sensitivity towards the “magnitude of the gesture” of various ecological 
scale disasters, the "loudness of the voice” of social imbalance. 
Bringing a notion of participation to the forefront of our search patterns, with an 
understanding of the complexities of communication that participation must exist within, 
emphasizes a ‘unity of subject and object’ that emerges with the dissolution of the 
destructive premise of the separation of mind and body. If all meaning is irrelevant 
without context and human personality unknowable outside of interpersonal 
relationships, if I carry my beliefs about the stars into the investigation I am conducting 
in my intellectual playground, and if we indeed are “our own metaphor,” there cannot be 
a notion, or even an illusion of externality or ‘proven’ objectivity and truth in our 
formulations. Bateson writes that an arrival (which is also an encounter) at such 
understanding “leads to a very profound and irresistible discovery that the laws and 
processes of our perception are a bridge which joins us inseparably to that which we 
Gregory Bateson, “The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication” in Steps to an Ecology of Mind 184
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perceive—a bridge which unites subject and object.”  Perception is the participatory 185
process that connects the observer with what is observed. Respective of the desire to 
know an external ‘thing’ is the desire towards language, of all communicative gestures 
emerging from a human body, entangling itself in a complex range of phenomena and 
relationships. Participation, then, comes to explain experiences within communicatively 
engaged and self-organized systemic-semiotic systems. Perhaps participation is itself a 
qualitative matrix of collectively shared experiences that connects the patterns of how the 
‘self’ meets another in their search, attesting to the very fact of recursive connectedness 
that allows for such possibility.  
It is from a logic of participation that perception is understood as involved in a meta-level 
process of communicating about the nature of the sort of communication that allows for a 
mutual participation in communication in the first place. This includes the fact of 
unknowing, an inaccessibility to the whole of what is going on, as a factor of unity or 
flexibility in systems, providing the space unfilled by conscious purpose to ‘relieve the 
stress,’ so to speak, of its demands. Resonance, then, occurs as a duration of the 
inheritance of conceptual structures in ongoing encounter with the traces of experience, 
the duration required for learned ideas and behaviours to match and meet with the 
strangeness that it is perpetually confronted as a fact of life. And perhaps it is to these 
durational patterns that science must cultivate a responsivity, if only to brush up against 
the vast untranslatability of resonant patterns with its previous or present vocabulary. As 
Bruno Latour asks, with some risk of losing oneself in the infinite: “How could we be 
chilled by the cold breath of the sciences, when the sciences are hot and fragile, human 
and controversial, full of thinking reeds and of subjects who are themselves inhabited by 
things?”   186
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The vibrations of certain resonances may contribute to the creation of new forms, 
patterns, and pulsations in the most general, yet multi-scalar sense of how we do things. 
‘Emergence’ is a word that has undergone much repetition throughout this chapter, in an 
attempt to emphasize the phenomenon of metacommunicational arrival by way of 
relationship. It is to also to the premise that the communicationality of a system may not 
be, and really most never is, equal to its linguistic forms, that resonance may be 
understood. That is, from the emergent noise of a system that resonance can be seen as 
fostering, or is constitutive of, circularities of deferred and indirect difference may 
resound a chance for us to approach new or revised premises with which relate with the 
world.  
From this place, I would like to conclude with a loving and resonant reminder that 
Gregory offered me throughout my time with this project, and ‘just living’ at other scales 
of my life: 
The fabrics of interaction are going to be torn and they’re going to mend. 
And after all, we are only a model of what we are trying to talk about, 
and it would be absolute nonsense to try to construct that model as 
though it did not contain the tearings of fabric.  187
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